GHSA-CRWG-8VM3-26RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-13 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfc: pn533: Add poll mod list filling check

In case of im_protocols value is 1 and tm_protocols value is 0 this combination successfully passes the check 'if (!im_protocols && !tm_protocols)' in the nfc_start_poll(). But then after pn533_poll_create_mod_list() call in pn533_start_poll() poll mod list will remain empty and dev->poll_mod_count will remain 0 which lead to division by zero.

Normally no im protocol has value 1 in the mask, so this combination is not expected by driver. But these protocol values actually come from userspace via Netlink interface (NFC_CMD_START_POLL operation). So a broken or malicious program may pass a message containing a "bad" combination of protocol parameter values so that dev->poll_mod_count is not incremented inside pn533_poll_create_mod_list(), thus leading to division by zero. Call trace looks like: nfc_genl_start_poll() nfc_start_poll() ->start_poll() pn533_start_poll()

Add poll mod list filling check.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-46676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-369"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-13T06:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfc: pn533: Add poll mod list filling check\n\nIn case of im_protocols value is 1 and tm_protocols value is 0 this\ncombination successfully passes the check\n\u0027if (!im_protocols \u0026\u0026 !tm_protocols)\u0027 in the nfc_start_poll().\nBut then after pn533_poll_create_mod_list() call in pn533_start_poll()\npoll mod list will remain empty and dev-\u003epoll_mod_count will remain 0\nwhich lead to division by zero.\n\nNormally no im protocol has value 1 in the mask, so this combination is\nnot expected by driver. But these protocol values actually come from\nuserspace via Netlink interface (NFC_CMD_START_POLL operation). So a\nbroken or malicious program may pass a message containing a \"bad\"\ncombination of protocol parameter values so that dev-\u003epoll_mod_count\nis not incremented inside pn533_poll_create_mod_list(), thus leading\nto division by zero.\nCall trace looks like:\nnfc_genl_start_poll()\n  nfc_start_poll()\n    -\u003estart_poll()\n    pn533_start_poll()\n\nAdd poll mod list filling check.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.",
  "id": "GHSA-crwg-8vm3-26rf",
  "modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:23Z",
  "published": "2024-09-13T06:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ad559cf6d87f250a8d203b555dfc3716afa946"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64513d0e546a1f19e390f7e5eba3872bfcbdacf5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7535db0624a2dede374c42040808ad9a9101d723"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ecd3dd4f8eecd3309432156ccfe24768e009ec4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ddaea033de051ed61b39f6b69ad54a411172b33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5e05237444f32f6cfe5d907603a232c77a08b31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/febccb39255f9df35527b88c953b2e0deae50e53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/10/msg00003.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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