GHSA-CR7V-WXRV-GP29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-03 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: rockchip: guard VPU981 AV1 divisor and tile buffer
rockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() divides context_update_tile_id by tile_info->tile_cols and writes one descriptor per tile into the tile_info DMA buffer, which holds AV1_MAX_TILES entries; tile_cols and tile_rows come from the bitstream. Guard the division against a zero tile_cols by initialising the context-update values to zero and computing them only when tile_cols is non-zero, and stop the descriptor writes once the tile_info buffer is full. The tile geometry written to the hardware registers is left unmodified; the per-dimension and total tile bounds are enforced by the control validation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97578"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: verisilicon: rockchip: guard VPU981 AV1 divisor and tile buffer\n\nrockchip_vpu981_av1_dec_set_tile_info() divides context_update_tile_id by\ntile_info-\u003etile_cols and writes one descriptor per tile into the tile_info\nDMA buffer, which holds AV1_MAX_TILES entries; tile_cols and tile_rows\ncome from the bitstream. Guard the division against a zero tile_cols by\ninitialising the context-update values to zero and computing them only\nwhen tile_cols is non-zero, and stop the descriptor writes once the\ntile_info buffer is full. The tile geometry written to the hardware\nregisters is left unmodified; the per-dimension and total tile bounds are\nenforced by the control validation.",
"id": "GHSA-cr7v-wxrv-gp29",
"modified": "2026-10-03T12:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b7a281a815ae7c5e7bb2aad039ffea9bc933157"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7baa7bb1b784c19170df8c99466fa412040eb431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8659e5fc21a82e00fb2db1557f2e06f0fca06b90"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f19d869a9f6800547c9ad7ebaf3b94f973dab50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b84f6533a8ed2fd7b282fc7ab4b8efadc745a89c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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