GHSA-CQHC-2H57-WPXF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:03 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:03
VLAI
Summary
MariaDB's connector leaks the cleartext password to an MitM despite `ssl: true`
Details

Summary

When SSL/TLS is enabled but no CA / server certificate is provided, the connector verifies the server's identity using fingerprint validation. The check is effective, the connection is ultimately rejected when it fails, but it happens after the authentication exchange. As a result, the credentials are sent before validation occurs, so an active man-in-the-middle who presents their own certificate receives the password in the handshake before the connection is aborted.

Impact

The credentials are transmitted to the peer before the server's identity is validated. An on-path attacker (MitM) presenting any certificate can capture the account password, even though the connection then fails the fingerprint check and is closed. The disclosed credentials can subsequently be used to authenticate directly against the server.

  • Attacker requirement: active man-in-the-middle position on the network path
  • Affected configuration: SSL/TLS enabled without a CA / server certificate

Affected versions

  • < 3.2.4
  • 3.3.0 – 3.3.2
  • 3.4.0 – 3.4.5
  • 3.5.0 – 3.5.2

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.4, 3.3.3, 3.4.6, and 3.5.3. Upgrade to one of these (or later) on your branch.

Workarounds

Until you can upgrade, configure certificate verification explicitly, provide the server/CA certificate and use a verifying SSL mode (e.g. VERIFY_CA / VERIFY_FULL).

Reported by haaahaaahiihiiii (no GitHub account).

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mariadb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mariadb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mariadb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mariadb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55215"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:03:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen SSL/TLS is enabled but no CA / server certificate is provided, the\nconnector verifies the server\u0027s identity using fingerprint validation. The\ncheck is effective,  the connection is ultimately rejected when it fails, \nbut it happens *after* the authentication exchange. As a result, the\ncredentials are sent before validation occurs, so an active man-in-the-middle\nwho presents their own certificate receives the password in the handshake\nbefore the connection is aborted.\n\n### Impact\nThe credentials are transmitted to the peer before the server\u0027s identity is\nvalidated. An on-path attacker (MitM) presenting any certificate can capture\nthe account password, even though the connection then fails the fingerprint\ncheck and is closed. The disclosed credentials can subsequently be used to\nauthenticate directly against the server.\n\n- Attacker requirement: active man-in-the-middle position on the network path\n- Affected configuration: SSL/TLS enabled without a CA / server certificate\n\n### Affected versions\n- \u003c 3.2.4\n- 3.3.0 \u2013 3.3.2\n- 3.4.0 \u2013 3.4.5\n- 3.5.0 \u2013 3.5.2\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 3.2.4, 3.3.3, 3.4.6, and 3.5.3. Upgrade to one of these (or later)\non your branch.\n\n### Workarounds\nUntil you can upgrade, configure certificate verification explicitly, provide\nthe server/CA certificate and use a verifying SSL mode (e.g. VERIFY_CA /\nVERIFY_FULL). \n\nReported by haaahaaahiihiiii (no GitHub account).",
  "id": "GHSA-cqhc-2h57-wpxf",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T19:03:38Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T19:03:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/security/advisories/GHSA-cqhc-2h57-wpxf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/commit/514576a5a1fab3ea8498613e259a0b7a764e7302"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/commit/c47d7275835c78c7eb8186cd23e9d57c045c128b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/commit/ecd36958e6e3bf0e0fa8389546f50c0ed6dbb2ac"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3777370"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/releases/tag/3.3.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/releases/tag/3.4.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-nodejs/releases/tag/3.5.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJS-349"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MariaDB\u0027s connector leaks the cleartext password to an MitM despite `ssl: true`"
}



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