GHSA-CQ4J-2685-H9RW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:05 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:05An issue was discovered on Enphase Envoy R3.x and D4.x devices. There is a custom PAM module for user authentication that circumvents traditional user authentication. This module uses a password derived from the MD5 hash of the username and serial number. The serial number can be retrieved by an unauthenticated user at /info.xml. Attempts to change the user password via passwd or other tools have no effect.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25754"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-916"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-16T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on Enphase Envoy R3.x and D4.x devices. There is a custom PAM module for user authentication that circumvents traditional user authentication. This module uses a password derived from the MD5 hash of the username and serial number. The serial number can be retrieved by an unauthenticated user at /info.xml. Attempts to change the user password via passwd or other tools have no effect.",
"id": "GHSA-cq4j-2685-h9rw",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:05:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:05:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25754"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://enphase.com/en-us/products-and-services/envoy-and-combiner"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/stage-2-security/can-solar-controllers-be-used-to-generate-fake-clean-energy-credits-4a7322e7661a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://stage2sec.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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