Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-CPWJ-27C2-JFGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 15:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid

Commit 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed get/put_pid(thread_pid)") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid(). It assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would keep thread_pid alive until then.

That assumption is wrong. __change_pid() only records a detached PID in post.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE. If another task still uses the exiting task's PID as its process group or session ID, __unhash_process() removes the exiting task's PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves the PID out of post.pids. release_task() therefore holds no reference to it after dropping tasklist_lock.

The other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links. Its free_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free the PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().

An unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this ordering. Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0
Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921

Call Trace:
 proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache
 release_task
 wait_consider_task
 __do_wait
 do_wait
 kernel_wait4

Freed by task 0:
 kmem_cache_free
 put_pid
 delayed_put_pid
 rcu_core

Last potentially related work creation:
 __call_rcu_common
 free_pids
 ksys_setsid

KASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad read 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid->inodes. With an explicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN report. The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while proc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the final free afterward.

Take a reference before __unhash_process() clears p->thread_pid and release it after proc_flush_pid() completes.

A tested source reproducer is available privately on request. No controlled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is claimed. The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer; v6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-97903"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nexit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid\n\nCommit 0a36bad01731 (\"release_task: kill the no longer needed\nget/put_pid(thread_pid)\") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid().\nIt assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would\nkeep thread_pid alive until then.\n\nThat assumption is wrong.  __change_pid() only records a detached PID in\npost.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE.  If another task\nstill uses the exiting task\u0027s PID as its process group or session ID,\n__unhash_process() removes the exiting task\u0027s PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves\nthe PID out of post.pids.  release_task() therefore holds no reference to\nit after dropping tasklist_lock.\n\nThe other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links.  Its\nfree_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free\nthe PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().\n\nAn unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this\nordering.  Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in\n    proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0\n    Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921\n\n    Call Trace:\n     proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache\n     release_task\n     wait_consider_task\n     __do_wait\n     do_wait\n     kernel_wait4\n\n    Freed by task 0:\n     kmem_cache_free\n     put_pid\n     delayed_put_pid\n     rcu_core\n\n    Last potentially related work creation:\n     __call_rcu_common\n     free_pids\n     ksys_setsid\n\nKASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad\nread 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid-\u003einodes.  With an\nexplicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN\nreport.  The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while\nproc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the\nfinal free afterward.\n\nTake a reference before __unhash_process() clears p-\u003ethread_pid and release\nit after proc_flush_pid() completes.\n\nA tested source reproducer is available privately on request.  No\ncontrolled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is\nclaimed.  The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer;\nv6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.",
  "id": "GHSA-cpwj-27c2-jfgq",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T15:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T12:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96803a12e8ac15f0a1b4b151db59038f12304e58"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb0936862f2b653114d9bd582ca26990ef54a64"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdd812d0683dee14ead02c9eded568685e61b23f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-97903 (GCVE-0-2026-97903)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 10:22 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:10

Title

exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid Commit 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed get/put_pid(thread_pid)") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid(). It assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would keep thread_pid alive until then. That assumption is wrong. __change_pid() only records a detached PID in post.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE. If another task still uses the exiting task's PID as its process group or session ID, __unhash_process() removes the exiting task's PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves the PID out of post.pids. release_task() therefore holds no reference to it after dropping tasklist_lock. The other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links. Its free_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free the PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid(). An unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this ordering. Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0 Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921 Call Trace: proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache release_task wait_consider_task __do_wait do_wait kernel_wait4 Freed by task 0: kmem_cache_free put_pid delayed_put_pid rcu_core Last potentially related work creation: __call_rcu_common free_pids ksys_setsid KASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad read 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid->inodes. With an explicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN report. The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while proc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the final free afterward. Take a reference before __unhash_process() clears p->thread_pid and release it after proc_flush_pid() completes. A tested source reproducer is available privately on request. No controlled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is claimed. The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer; v6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6641 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb0936862f2b6531…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96803a12e8ac15f0a…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdd812d0683dee14e…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 0a36bad01731e71568bdd365764d38b6bd576ab0 , < bcb0936862f2b653114d9bd582ca26990ef54a64 (git) Affected: 0a36bad01731e71568bdd365764d38b6bd576ab0 , < 96803a12e8ac15f0a1b4b151db59038f12304e58 (git) Affected: 0a36bad01731e71568bdd365764d38b6bd576ab0 , < cdd812d0683dee14ead02c9eded568685e61b23f (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.16 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.16 (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.53 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.7 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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              "version": "6.16"
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            },
            {
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nexit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid\n\nCommit 0a36bad01731 (\"release_task: kill the no longer needed\nget/put_pid(thread_pid)\") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid().\nIt assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would\nkeep thread_pid alive until then.\n\nThat assumption is wrong.  __change_pid() only records a detached PID in\npost.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE.  If another task\nstill uses the exiting task\u0027s PID as its process group or session ID,\n__unhash_process() removes the exiting task\u0027s PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves\nthe PID out of post.pids.  release_task() therefore holds no reference to\nit after dropping tasklist_lock.\n\nThe other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links.  Its\nfree_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free\nthe PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().\n\nAn unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this\nordering.  Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:\n\n    BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in\n    proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0\n    Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921\n\n    Call Trace:\n     proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache\n     release_task\n     wait_consider_task\n     __do_wait\n     do_wait\n     kernel_wait4\n\n    Freed by task 0:\n     kmem_cache_free\n     put_pid\n     delayed_put_pid\n     rcu_core\n\n    Last potentially related work creation:\n     __call_rcu_common\n     free_pids\n     ksys_setsid\n\nKASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad\nread 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid-\u003einodes.  With an\nexplicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN\nreport.  The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while\nproc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the\nfinal free afterward.\n\nTake a reference before __unhash_process() clears p-\u003ethread_pid and release\nit after proc_flush_pid() completes.\n\nA tested source reproducer is available privately on request.  No\ncontrolled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is\nclaimed.  The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer;\nv6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport."
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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