GHSA-CP82-8Q86-PM99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-22 03:31 – Updated: 2024-09-12 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv: fix oops caused by irqsoff latency tracer

The trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() require the caller to setup frame pointer properly. This because these two functions use macro 'CALLER_ADDR1' (aka. __builtin_return_address(1)) to acquire caller info. If the $fp is used for other purpose, the code generated this macro (as below) could trigger memory access fault.

0xffffffff8011510e <+80>: ld a1,-16(s0) 0xffffffff80115112 <+84>: ld s2,-8(a1) # <-- paging fault here

The oops message during booting if compiled with 'irqoff' tracer enabled: [ 0.039615][ T0] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8 [ 0.041925][ T0] Oops [#1] [ 0.042063][ T0] Modules linked in: [ 0.042864][ T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-00233-g9a20c48d1ed2 #29 [ 0.043568][ T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.044343][ T0] epc : trace_hardirqs_on+0x56/0xe2 [ 0.044601][ T0] ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e [ 0.044721][ T0] epc : ffffffff80126a5c ra : ffffffff80003b94 sp : ffffffff81403db0 [ 0.044801][ T0] gp : ffffffff8163acd8 tp : ffffffff81414880 t0 : 0000000000000020 [ 0.044882][ T0] t1 : 0098968000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81403de0 [ 0.044967][ T0] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000001 a1 : 0000000000000100 [ 0.045046][ T0] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.045124][ T0] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000054494d45 [ 0.045210][ T0] s2 : ffffffff80003b94 s3 : ffffffff81a8f1b0 s4 : ffffffff80e27b50 [ 0.045289][ T0] s5 : ffffffff81414880 s6 : ffffffff8160fa00 s7 : 00000000800120e8 [ 0.045389][ T0] s8 : 0000000080013100 s9 : 000000000000007f s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.045474][ T0] s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 7fffffffffffffff t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.045548][ T0] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ffffffff814aa368 [ 0.045620][ T0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 00000000000000f8 cause: 000000000000000d [ 0.046402][ T0] [] restore_all+0x12/0x6e

This because the $fp(aka. $s0) register is not used as frame pointer in the assembly entry code.

resume_kernel:
    REG_L s0, TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT(tp)
    bnez s0, restore_all
    REG_L s0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
            andi s0, s0, _TIF_NEED_RESCHED
            beqz s0, restore_all
            call preempt_schedule_irq
            j restore_all

To fix above issue, here we add one extra level wrapper for function trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() so they can be safely called by low level entry code.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-22T02:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv: fix oops caused by irqsoff latency tracer\n\nThe trace_hardirqs_{on,off}() require the caller to setup frame pointer\nproperly. This because these two functions use macro \u0027CALLER_ADDR1\u0027 (aka.\n__builtin_return_address(1)) to acquire caller info. If the $fp is used\nfor other purpose, the code generated this macro (as below) could trigger\nmemory access fault.\n\n   0xffffffff8011510e \u003c+80\u003e:    ld      a1,-16(s0)\n   0xffffffff80115112 \u003c+84\u003e:    ld      s2,-8(a1)  # \u003c-- paging fault here\n\nThe oops message during booting if compiled with \u0027irqoff\u0027 tracer enabled:\n[    0.039615][    T0] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000f8\n[    0.041925][    T0] Oops [#1]\n[    0.042063][    T0] Modules linked in:\n[    0.042864][    T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-00233-g9a20c48d1ed2 #29\n[    0.043568][    T0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)\n[    0.044343][    T0] epc : trace_hardirqs_on+0x56/0xe2\n[    0.044601][    T0]  ra : restore_all+0x12/0x6e\n[    0.044721][    T0] epc : ffffffff80126a5c ra : ffffffff80003b94 sp : ffffffff81403db0\n[    0.044801][    T0]  gp : ffffffff8163acd8 tp : ffffffff81414880 t0 : 0000000000000020\n[    0.044882][    T0]  t1 : 0098968000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81403de0\n[    0.044967][    T0]  s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000000000000001 a1 : 0000000000000100\n[    0.045046][    T0]  a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000\n[    0.045124][    T0]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000054494d45\n[    0.045210][    T0]  s2 : ffffffff80003b94 s3 : ffffffff81a8f1b0 s4 : ffffffff80e27b50\n[    0.045289][    T0]  s5 : ffffffff81414880 s6 : ffffffff8160fa00 s7 : 00000000800120e8\n[    0.045389][    T0]  s8 : 0000000080013100 s9 : 000000000000007f s10: 0000000000000000\n[    0.045474][    T0]  s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : 7fffffffffffffff t4 : 0000000000000000\n[    0.045548][    T0]  t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ffffffff814aa368\n[    0.045620][    T0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 00000000000000f8 cause: 000000000000000d\n[    0.046402][    T0] [\u003cffffffff80003b94\u003e] restore_all+0x12/0x6e\n\nThis because the $fp(aka. $s0) register is not used as frame pointer in the\nassembly entry code.\n\n\tresume_kernel:\n\t\tREG_L s0, TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT(tp)\n\t\tbnez s0, restore_all\n\t\tREG_L s0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)\n                andi s0, s0, _TIF_NEED_RESCHED\n                beqz s0, restore_all\n                call preempt_schedule_irq\n                j restore_all\n\nTo fix above issue, here we add one extra level wrapper for function\ntrace_hardirqs_{on,off}() so they can be safely called by low level entry\ncode.",
  "id": "GHSA-cp82-8q86-pm99",
  "modified": "2024-09-12T15:32:59Z",
  "published": "2024-08-22T03:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1851b9a467065b18ec2cba156eea345206df1c8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e2100b1b07d6f5acc71cc1acb53f680c677d77"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e2dbc31e367d08ee299a0d8aeb498cb2e12a1c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5e180490db4af8c0f80c4b65ee482d333d0e8ee"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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