GHSA-CP82-3R67-94RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate()

The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM label storage area. __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config area size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product nslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before the comparison. A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the loop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end of the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write.

The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace via ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA. Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected.

The check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm: namespace indices: read and validate"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct nd_namespace_label), a size_t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not wrap. Commit 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label definitions") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime value read via sizeof_namespace_label().

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89559"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate()\n\nThe on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM\nlabel storage area.  __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config\narea size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product\nnslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before\nthe comparison.  A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the\nloop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end\nof the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write.\n\nThe field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace\nvia ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA.  Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound\ncheck is exact; conforming labels are unaffected.\n\nThe check was safe when introduced by commit 4a826c83db4e (\"libnvdimm:\nnamespace indices: read and validate\"): it multiplied by sizeof(struct\nnd_namespace_label), a size_t, so on a 64-bit build the product did not\nwrap.  Commit 564e871aa66f (\"libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label\ndefinitions\") narrowed it to 32 bits when the label size became a runtime\nvalue read via sizeof_namespace_label().",
  "id": "GHSA-cp82-3r67-94rf",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:29Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89559"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/037770686126155eafc44501312989e2837b9659"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09e649117c54b7e1c004f22eaa19efbadd9ac856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c391696d2791f82ae462e11da9a0d96f90b240c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6030597ec683d1e5b46445f888bb5c7776b5a0c4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69a734359639fca16a0dd73ab17a34943e76c68b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93967bfb17dab66642c57e609c99e1a91fe11278"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4975f2ff6c82adc24ae547f029f82530ba43cfe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e057efcc9c71d90099d9ee00bed0748d0e9fd586"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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