GHSA-CMM4-P9V2-Q453
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-03 04:41 – Updated: 2025-04-04 14:19Concrete CMS version 9 below 9.4.0RC2 and versions below 8.5.20 are vulnerable to CSRF and XSS in the Concrete CMS Address attribute because addresses are not properly sanitized in the output when a country is not specified. Attackers are limited to individuals whom a site administrator has granted the ability to fill in an address attribute. It is possible for the attacker to glean limited information from the site but amount and type is restricted by mitigating controls and the level of access of the attacker. Limited data modification is possible. The dashboard page itself could be rendered unavailable. The fix only sanitizes new data uploaded post update to Concrete CMS 9.4.0RC2. Existing database entries added before the update will still be “live” if there were successful exploits added under previous versions; a database search is recommended. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability CVSS v.4.0 score of 5.1 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L Thanks Myq Larson for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "concrete5/concrete5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.4.0RC2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "concrete5/concrete5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-3153"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-04T14:19:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-03T02:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Concrete CMS version 9 below 9.4.0RC2 and versions below 8.5.20 are vulnerable to CSRF and XSS in the Concrete CMS Address attribute because addresses are not properly sanitized in the output when a country is not specified.\u00a0 Attackers are limited to individuals whom a site administrator has granted the ability to fill in an address attribute. It is possible for the attacker to glean limited information from the site but amount and type is restricted by mitigating controls and the level of access of the attacker. Limited data modification is possible. The dashboard page itself could be rendered unavailable. \nThe fix only sanitizes new data uploaded post update to Concrete CMS 9.4.0RC2. Existing database entries added before the update will still be \u201clive\u201d if there were successful exploits added under previous versions; a database search is recommended. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability CVSS v.4.0 score of 5.1 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L\u00a0Thanks Myq Larson for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-cmm4-p9v2-q453",
"modified": "2025-04-04T14:19:10Z",
"published": "2025-04-03T04:41:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/concretecms/concretecms/pull/12511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/concretecms/concretecms/pull/12512"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.concretecms.org/9-x/developers/introduction/version-history/940-release-notes"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/concretecms/concretecms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/concretecms/concretecms/releases/tag/8.5.20"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Concrete CMS Vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.