GHSA-CJQW-C337-F535

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: xhci: Fix bounce buffer overflow

High-speed devices with out of spec 1024 byte bulk endpoints exist and are allowed by USB core, but xhci-hcd always sets packet size to 512. The exact nature of these devices isn't documented, commit fb5ee84ea72c ("USB: Accept bulk endpoints with 1024-byte maxpacket") only states that they "don't work with xHCI host controllers", whatever it means.

But somebody (or a malicious device) can try, and then the driver will allocate a 512 byte bounce buffer for this endpoint and may write up to 1024 bytes into it if particular scatter-gather URBs are used, because xhci_align_td() obtains packet size from the descriptor. Fix this.

As a side effect, TRBs will be aligned to the packet size chosen by the driver on all endpoints of all speeds. Alignment serves the xHC, not device, so this is fine. Only out of spec devices are affected anyway.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99308"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:05Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: xhci: Fix bounce buffer overflow\n\nHigh-speed devices with out of spec 1024 byte bulk endpoints exist and\nare allowed by USB core, but xhci-hcd always sets packet size to 512.\nThe exact nature of these devices isn\u0027t documented, commit fb5ee84ea72c\n(\"USB: Accept bulk endpoints with 1024-byte maxpacket\") only states\nthat they \"don\u0027t work with xHCI host controllers\", whatever it means.\n\nBut somebody (or a malicious device) can try, and then the driver will\nallocate a 512 byte bounce buffer for this endpoint and may write up to\n1024 bytes into it if particular scatter-gather URBs are used, because\nxhci_align_td() obtains packet size from the descriptor. Fix this.\n\nAs a side effect, TRBs will be aligned to the packet size chosen by the\ndriver on all endpoints of all speeds. Alignment serves the xHC, not\ndevice, so this is fine. Only out of spec devices are affected anyway.",
  "id": "GHSA-cjqw-c337-f535",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68c5cb7574c567e83ba95258cb146db95e069a87"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0d15d7a11f2a45e5d29ab4780a094992d7a26a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e95ace4abebd564b50b856513e24853d35be06cd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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