GHSA-CHXM-MHWW-444H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-14 15:33 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache
As Hong Yun reported in mailing list:
loop7: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kmem_cache of name 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7' already exists WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 __kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 24426 Comm: syz.7.1370 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline] RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307 Call Trace: __kmem_cache_create include/linux/slab.h:353 [inline] f2fs_kmem_cache_create fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2943 [inline] f2fs_init_xattr_caches+0xa5/0xe0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:843 f2fs_fill_super+0x1645/0x2620 fs/f2fs/super.c:4918 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x1fb/0x260 fs/super.c:1692 vfs_get_tree+0x43/0x140 fs/super.c:1815 do_new_mount+0x201/0x550 fs/namespace.c:3808 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x298/0x2f0 fs/namespace.c:4324 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The bug can be reproduced w/ below scripts: - mount /dev/vdb /mnt1 - mount /dev/vdc /mnt2 - umount /mnt1 - mounnt /dev/vdb /mnt1
The reason is if we created two slab caches, named f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 and f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7, and they have the same slab size. Actually, slab system will only create one slab cache core structure which has slab name of "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3", and two slab caches share the same structure and cache address.
So, if we destroy f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 cache w/ cache address, it will decrease reference count of slab cache, rather than release slab cache entirely, since there is one more user has referenced the cache.
Then, if we try to create slab cache w/ name "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3" again, slab system will find that there is existed cache which has the same name and trigger the warning.
Let's changes to use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache for fixing.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T15:15:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache\n\nAs Hong Yun reported in mailing list:\n\nloop7: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkmem_cache of name \u0027f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7\u0027 already exists\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline]\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 __kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 24426 Comm: syz.7.1370 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline]\nRIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307\nCall Trace:\n\u00a0__kmem_cache_create include/linux/slab.h:353 [inline]\n\u00a0f2fs_kmem_cache_create fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2943 [inline]\n\u00a0f2fs_init_xattr_caches+0xa5/0xe0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:843\n\u00a0f2fs_fill_super+0x1645/0x2620 fs/f2fs/super.c:4918\n\u00a0get_tree_bdev_flags+0x1fb/0x260 fs/super.c:1692\n\u00a0vfs_get_tree+0x43/0x140 fs/super.c:1815\n\u00a0do_new_mount+0x201/0x550 fs/namespace.c:3808\n\u00a0do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline]\n\u00a0__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline]\n\u00a0__se_sys_mount+0x298/0x2f0 fs/namespace.c:4324\n\u00a0do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n\u00a0do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n\u00a0entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe bug can be reproduced w/ below scripts:\n- mount /dev/vdb /mnt1\n- mount /dev/vdc /mnt2\n- umount /mnt1\n- mounnt /dev/vdb /mnt1\n\nThe reason is if we created two slab caches, named f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3\nand f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7, and they have the same slab size. Actually,\nslab system will only create one slab cache core structure which has\nslab name of \"f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3\", and two slab caches share the same\nstructure and cache address.\n\nSo, if we destroy f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 cache w/ cache address, it will\ndecrease reference count of slab cache, rather than release slab cache\nentirely, since there is one more user has referenced the cache.\n\nThen, if we try to create slab cache w/ name \"f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3\" again,\nslab system will find that there is existed cache which has the same name\nand trigger the warning.\n\nLet\u0027s changes to use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache\nfor fixing.",
"id": "GHSA-chxm-mhww-444h",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:22Z",
"published": "2026-01-14T15:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eb0b130196bcbc56c5c80c83139fa70c0aa82c5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f27ef42bb0b7c0740c5616ec577ec188b8a1d05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/474cc3ed37436ddfd63cac8dbffe3b1e219e9100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72ce19dfed162da6e430467333b2da70471d08a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93d30fe19660dec6bf1bd3d5c186c1c737b21aa5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be4c3a3c6c2304a8fcd14095d18d26f0cc4e222a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6d828eae00ec192e18c2ddaa2fd32050a96048a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.