GHSA-CHFM-68VV-PVW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-01 16:40 – Updated: 2024-05-01 16:40Impact
When performing XSLT transformations XMLUnit for Java did not disable XSLT extension functions by default. Depending on the XSLT processor being used this could allow arbitrary code to be executed when XMLUnit is used to transform data with a stylesheet who's source can not be trusted. If the stylesheet can be provided externally this may even lead to a remote code execution.
Patches
Users are advised to upgrade to XMLUnit for Java 2.10.0 where the default has been changed by means of https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/commit/b81d48b71dfd2868bdfc30a3e17ff973f32bc15b
Workarounds
XMLUnit's main use-case is performing tests on code that generates or processes XML. Most users will not use it to perform arbitrary XSLT transformations.
Users running XSLT transformations with untrusted stylesheets should explicitly use XMLUnit's APIs to pass in a pre-configured TraX TransformerFactory with extension functions disabled via features and attributes. The required setFactory or setTransformerFactory methods have been available since XMLUnit for Java 2.0.0.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xmlunit:xmlunit-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-01T16:40:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWhen performing XSLT transformations XMLUnit for Java did not disable XSLT extension functions by default. Depending on the XSLT processor being used this could allow arbitrary code to be executed when XMLUnit is used to transform data with a stylesheet who\u0027s source can not be trusted. If the stylesheet can be provided externally this may even lead to a remote code execution.\n\n## Patches\nUsers are advised to upgrade to XMLUnit for Java 2.10.0 where the default has been changed by means of https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/commit/b81d48b71dfd2868bdfc30a3e17ff973f32bc15b\n\n### Workarounds\nXMLUnit\u0027s main use-case is performing tests on code that generates or processes XML. Most users will not use it to perform arbitrary XSLT transformations.\n\nUsers running XSLT transformations with untrusted stylesheets should explicitly use XMLUnit\u0027s APIs to pass in a pre-configured TraX `TransformerFactory` with extension functions disabled via features and attributes. The required `setFactory` or `setTransformerFactory` methods have been available since XMLUnit for Java 2.0.0.\n\n### References\n[Bug Report](https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/issues/264)\n[JAXP Security Guide](https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/22/security/java-api-xml-processing-jaxp-security-guide.html#GUID-E345AA09-801E-4B95-B83D-7F0C452538AA)\n",
"id": "GHSA-chfm-68vv-pvw5",
"modified": "2024-05-01T16:40:01Z",
"published": "2024-05-01T16:40:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/security/advisories/GHSA-chfm-68vv-pvw5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/issues/264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit/commit/b81d48b71dfd2868bdfc30a3e17ff973f32bc15b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.oracle.com/en/java/javase/22/security/java-api-xml-processing-jaxp-security-guide.html#GUID-E345AA09-801E-4B95-B83D-7F0C452538AA"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xmlunit/xmlunit"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "XMLUnit for Java has Insecure Defaults when Processing XSLT Stylesheets"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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