GHSA-CH68-7CF4-35VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-07 21:57 – Updated: 2022-02-07 21:57Impact
This impacts deployments using SAML SSO in two specific cases:
- A malicious or compromised Service Provider (SP) could reuse the SAML response to log into Fleet as a user -- only if the user has an account with the same email in Fleet, and the user signs into the malicious SP via SAML SSO from the same Identity Provider (IdP) configured with Fleet.
- A user with an account in Fleet could reuse a SAML response intended for another SP to log into Fleet. This is only a concern if the user is blocked from Fleet in the IdP, but continues to have an account in Fleet. If the user is blocked from the IdP entirely, this cannot be exploited.
Patches
Fleet 4.9.1 resolves this issue.
Workarounds and good practices
- Reduce the length of sessions on your IdP to reduce the window for malicious re-use.
- Limit the amount of SAML Service Providers/Applications used by user accounts with access to Fleet.
- When removing access to Fleet in the IdP, delete the Fleet user from Fleet as well.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Join us in the #fleet channel of osquery Slack. * Email us at security@fleetdm.com.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23600"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-03T17:19:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-02-04T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThis impacts deployments using SAML SSO in two specific cases:\n\n1. A malicious or compromised Service Provider (SP) could reuse the SAML response to log into Fleet as a user -- only if the user has an account with the same email in Fleet, _and_ the user signs into the malicious SP via SAML SSO from the same Identity Provider (IdP) configured with Fleet.\n2. A user with an account in Fleet could reuse a SAML response intended for another SP to log into Fleet. This is only a concern if the user is blocked from Fleet in the IdP, but continues to have an account in Fleet. If the user is blocked from the IdP entirely, this cannot be exploited.\n\n### Patches\nFleet 4.9.1 resolves this issue.\n\n### Workarounds and good practices\n* Reduce the length of sessions on your IdP to reduce the window for malicious re-use.\n* Limit the amount of SAML Service Providers/Applications used by user accounts with access to Fleet.\n* When removing access to Fleet in the IdP, delete the Fleet user from Fleet as well.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Join us in the #fleet channel of [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw).\n* Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com).",
"id": "GHSA-ch68-7cf4-35vr",
"modified": "2022-02-07T21:57:38Z",
"published": "2022-02-07T21:57:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-ch68-7cf4-35vr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/commit/35d5a7b285f15ddd47486fa656e8b1acf3d48374"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Limited ability to spoof SAML authentication with missing audience verification in Fleet"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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