GHSA-CGJX-MWPX-47JV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-10-23 17:14 – Updated: 2020-08-31 18:10
VLAI
Summary
Private Data Disclosure in express-restify-mongoose
Details

Affected versions of express-restify-mongoose are susceptible to an information leakage vulnerability which may allow an attacker to access fields on a model even if those fields are marked as private.

Proof of Concept

If you have a user model that you want to protect, such as the following User model:

const User = mongoose.model('User', new mongoose.Schema({
    name: String,
    password: String,
}));

You would normally do something such as:

restify.serve(router, User, {
    private: ['password'], // Set the password part of User as private, so outside people can't read it
})

This would hide the password field from people that send your application a GET /User and GET /User/some-user-id request.

A malicious user can go to your application and send a request for GET /User?distinct=password and get all the passwords for all the users in the database, despite the field being set to private. This could be used for other private data, if the malicious user knew what was set as private for specific routes.

Recommendation

Version 2.x: Update to version 2.5.0 or later. Version 3.x: Update to version 3.1.0 or later.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "express-restify-mongoose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "express-restify-mongoose"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-10533"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:31:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Affected versions of `express-restify-mongoose` are susceptible to an information leakage vulnerability which may allow an attacker to access fields on a model even if those fields are marked as private.\n\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nIf you have a user model that you want to protect, such as the following User model:\n```\nconst User = mongoose.model(\u0027User\u0027, new mongoose.Schema({\n    name: String,\n    password: String,\n}));\n```\n\nYou would normally do something such as:\n```\nrestify.serve(router, User, {\n    private: [\u0027password\u0027], // Set the password part of User as private, so outside people can\u0027t read it\n})\n```\n\nThis would hide the password field from people that send your application a `GET /User` and `GET /User/some-user-id` request. \n\nA malicious user can go to your application and send a request for `GET /User?distinct=password` and get all the passwords for all the users in the database, despite the field being set to private. This could be used for other private data, if the malicious user knew what was set as private for specific routes.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nVersion 2.x: Update to version 2.5.0 or later.\nVersion 3.x: Update to version 3.1.0 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-cgjx-mwpx-47jv",
  "modified": "2020-08-31T18:10:32Z",
  "published": "2018-10-23T17:14:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10533"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/florianholzapfel/express-restify-mongoose/issues/252"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/florianholzapfel/express-restify-mongoose/pull/253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/florianholzapfel/express-restify-mongoose/commit/23ccb247d0074bfaca6737cdff52d89c6d6e4a7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/florianholzapfel/express-restify-mongoose/commit/746defcd808e2ed1e8931dc36702b25b7db0e94b"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cgjx-mwpx-47jv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/92"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Private Data Disclosure in express-restify-mongoose"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.