GHSA-CF5F-CWF6-82GC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item
If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls) with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.
This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same) we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size, the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not initialized and we only copy the value's data and set the value's length in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name's length, the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and transaction ID.
The following script reproduces the issue:
$ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash
DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV mount $DEV $MNT
touch $MNT/testfile
# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item. setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile setfattr -n user.WvG1c1Td -v qwerty $MNT/testfile
# Verify the xattrs are present. echo "xattrs before:" getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
# Now replace the value of the foobar xattr with a significantly larger # value. setfattr -n user.foobar -v abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz $MNT/testfile
# Check the xattrs have the expected values. echo "xattrs after:" getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile
umount $MNT
Running it:
$ ./test.sh (...) xattrs before: # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty" user.foobar="123"
xattrs after: # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile user.WvG1c1Td="qwerty"
So the "user.foobar" xattr is missing and there was a transaction abort when unmounting the fs with the following traces in dmesg:
$ dmesg [869800.159271] BTRFS warning (device sdi): access to eb bytenr 30474240 len 16384 out of range start 16015 len 25964 [869800.159293] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [869800.159296] WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4408 at report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs], CPU#8: getfattr/2605179 [869800.168961] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_thin_pool (...) [869800.190527] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 2605179 Comm: getfattr Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-244+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [869800.193726] Tainted: [W]=WARN [869800.194502] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [869800.197576] RIP: 0010:report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] [869800.198985] Code: 48 8b 7b 18 (...) [869800.203531] RSP: 0018:ffffce4541937d58 EFLAGS: 00010246 [869800.204609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8dde054b8738 RCX: 0000000000000000 [869800.206137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc04c92a0 [869800.207645] RBP: 0000000000003e8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff [869800.226175] R10: ffffce4541937a88 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 000000000000656c [869800.227594] R13: ffff8dde14be800f R14: 000000000000656c R15: 0000000000000069 [869800.229097] FS: 00007f59023bb780(0000) GS:ffff8de5788ed000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [869800.231137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [869800.232321] CR2: 0000558dc45e6a78 CR3: 0000000765b16004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [869800.233783] Call Trace: [869800.234330] [869800.234791] read_extent_buffer+0x4d/0x100 [btrfs] [869800.235898] btrfs_listxattr+0x199/0x240 [btrfs] [869800.236912] vfs_listxattr+0x51/0 ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98959"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:17Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item\n\nIf we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we\nreplace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)\nwith another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully\ninitialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree\nchecker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.\n\nThis is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with\nmultiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)\nwe delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new\none, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in\nthe leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,\nthe new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not\ninitialized and we only copy the value\u0027s data and set the value\u0027s length\nin the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name\u0027s length,\nthe key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and\ntransaction ID.\n\nThe following script reproduces the issue:\n\n $ cat test.sh\n #!/bin/bash\n\n DEV=/dev/sdi\n MNT=/mnt/sdi\n\n mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV\n mount $DEV $MNT\n\n touch $MNT/testfile\n\n # Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their\n # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.\n setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile\n setfattr -n user.WvG1c1Td -v qwerty $MNT/testfile\n\n # Verify the xattrs are present.\n echo \"xattrs before:\"\n getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile\n\n # Now replace the value of the foobar xattr with a significantly larger\n # value.\n setfattr -n user.foobar -v abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz $MNT/testfile\n\n # Check the xattrs have the expected values.\n echo \"xattrs after:\"\n getfattr --absolute-names --dump $MNT/testfile\n\n umount $MNT\n\nRunning it:\n\n $ ./test.sh\n (...)\n xattrs before:\n # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile\n user.WvG1c1Td=\"qwerty\"\n user.foobar=\"123\"\n\n xattrs after:\n # file: /mnt/sdi/testfile\n user.WvG1c1Td=\"qwerty\"\n\nSo the \"user.foobar\" xattr is missing and there was a transaction abort\nwhen unmounting the fs with the following traces in dmesg:\n\n $ dmesg\n [869800.159271] BTRFS warning (device sdi): access to eb bytenr 30474240 len 16384 out of range start 16015 len 25964\n [869800.159293] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n [869800.159296] WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4408 at report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs], CPU#8: getfattr/2605179\n [869800.168961] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_thin_pool (...)\n [869800.190527] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 2605179 Comm: getfattr Tainted: G W 7.3.0-rc3-btrfs-next-244+ #1 PREEMPT(full)\n [869800.193726] Tainted: [W]=WARN\n [869800.194502] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\n [869800.197576] RIP: 0010:report_eb_range+0x44/0x60 [btrfs]\n [869800.198985] Code: 48 8b 7b 18 (...)\n [869800.203531] RSP: 0018:ffffce4541937d58 EFLAGS: 00010246\n [869800.204609] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8dde054b8738 RCX: 0000000000000000\n [869800.206137] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc04c92a0\n [869800.207645] RBP: 0000000000003e8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3fffffffffefffff\n [869800.226175] R10: ffffce4541937a88 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 000000000000656c\n [869800.227594] R13: ffff8dde14be800f R14: 000000000000656c R15: 0000000000000069\n [869800.229097] FS: 00007f59023bb780(0000) GS:ffff8de5788ed000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n [869800.231137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n [869800.232321] CR2: 0000558dc45e6a78 CR3: 0000000765b16004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\n [869800.233783] Call Trace:\n [869800.234330] \u003cTASK\u003e\n [869800.234791] read_extent_buffer+0x4d/0x100 [btrfs]\n [869800.235898] btrfs_listxattr+0x199/0x240 [btrfs]\n [869800.236912] vfs_listxattr+0x51/0\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-cf5f-cwf6-82gc",
"modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:47Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5877d7138cc4359d26fd7b010eedfd1b3162348f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a53bb4668b319fc6c8a3ce2c21635125c7d2712"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/858bee1c77857aabcc2327cd32dd8266332de332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a97114b9b00ed3d05156f3b2ddbf797296260389"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1803697a60f22743aa28ad522f805e92d45e3f0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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