GHSA-CF55-F79Q-6CGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-11 18:31 – Updated: 2024-12-12 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump
A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced by following steps:
-
run nginx/wrk test: smc_run nginx smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d -H 'Connection: Close'
-
continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel: watch -n 1 'smcss -D'
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] Call Trace: ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430 ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170 smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag] smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag] netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320 __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300 smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag] ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110 sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420 __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160 ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0 __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
It is possible that the connection is in process of being established when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-11T18:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump\n\nA crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced\nby following steps:\n\n- run nginx/wrk test:\n smc_run nginx\n smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d \u003cduration\u003e -H \u0027Connection: Close\u0027 \u003cURL\u003e\n\n- continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel:\n watch -n 1 \u0027smcss -D\u0027\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030\n CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G\tE 6.7.0+ #55\n RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __die+0x24/0x70\n ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150\n ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30\n ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag]\n ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430\n ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170\n smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag]\n smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag]\n netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320\n __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300\n smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag]\n ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag]\n sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140\n ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10\n netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110\n sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40\n netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330\n netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420\n __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300\n ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0\n ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160\n ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100\n ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110\n ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0\n __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80\n do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76\n\nIt is possible that the connection is in process of being established\nwhen we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a\nlink group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been\ninitialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to\nconn-\u003ermb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump.",
"id": "GHSA-cf55-f79q-6cgp",
"modified": "2024-12-12T18:30:50Z",
"published": "2024-03-11T18:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fea9969b81c67d0cb1611d1b8b7d19049d937be"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27aea64838914c6122db5b8bd4bed865c9736f22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fed92ca32eafbfae8b6bee8ca34cca71c6a8b6d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68b888d51ac82f2b96bf5e077a31d76afcdef25a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6994dba06321e3c48fdad0ba796a063d9d82183a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f3f9186e5bb96a9c9654c41653210e3ea7e48a6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a164c2922675d7051805cdaf2b07daffe44f20d9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbc153fd3c142909e564bb256da087e13fbf239c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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