GHSA-CF52-4QC8-H2H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix memory leak in vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb()
During the closure of a datagram socket, the vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb() function may be called, which will add the packets to the socket's backlog; then, after the receive queue is cleared, the __release_sock() function will move the packet back from the socket's backlog to the receive queue, which will lead to a memory leak.
sock_close __sock_release __vsock_release // take ownership by user-space lock_sock_nested sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) vmci_transport_release vmci_dispatch_dgs vmci_datagram_invoke_guest_handler vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb sk_receive_skb if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) [...] (!) else if sk_add_backlog() [...] (!) skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
release_sock
__release_sock
// move all packets from the backlog
// to the receive queue
(!) sk_backlog_rcv vsock_queue_rcv_skb [...] __sock_queue_rcv_skb if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) // Since the socket is "dead", the function will not // be called sk->sk_data_ready(sk) sock_release_ownership(sk); sock_put
Add a receive queue cleanup in the socket destructor to fix this.
syzkaller report:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880117bfb80 (size 240): comm "irq/56-vmw_vmci", pid 205, jiffies 4295064448 (age 73.992s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 78 dc 26 1e 80 88 ff ff 78 dc 26 1e 80 88 ff ff x.&.....x.&..... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 da 26 1e 80 88 ff ff ..........&..... backtrace: [] __alloc_skb+0x287/0x330 net/core/skbuff.c:505 [] vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb+0xbd/0x210 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport] [] vmci_datagram_invoke_guest_handler+0x366/0x450 [vmw_vmci] [] vmci_dispatch_dgs+0x235/0x490 [vmw_vmci] [] vmci_interrupt+0x55/0x290 [vmw_vmci] [] irq_thread_fn+0x8b/0x1a0 kernel/irq/manage.c:1205 [] irq_thread+0x28e/0x530 kernel/irq/manage.c:1314 [] kthread+0x2e6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 [] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98947"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix memory leak in vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb()\n\nDuring the closure of a datagram socket, the vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb()\nfunction may be called, which will add the packets\nto the socket\u0027s backlog; then, after the receive queue is cleared,\nthe __release_sock() function will move the packet back from the socket\u0027s\nbacklog to the receive queue, which will lead to a memory leak.\n\nsock_close\n __sock_release\n __vsock_release\n // take ownership by user-space\n lock_sock_nested\n sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)\n vmci_transport_release\n vmci_dispatch_dgs\n vmci_datagram_invoke_guest_handler\n vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb\n sk_receive_skb\n if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))\n [...]\n (!) else if sk_add_backlog()\n [...]\n (!) skb_queue_purge(\u0026sk-\u003esk_receive_queue)\n\n release_sock\n __release_sock\n // move all packets from the backlog\n // to the receive queue\n (!) sk_backlog_rcv\n vsock_queue_rcv_skb\n [...]\n __sock_queue_rcv_skb\n if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))\n // Since the socket is \"dead\", the function will not\n // be called\n sk-\u003esk_data_ready(sk)\n sock_release_ownership(sk);\n sock_put\n\nAdd a receive queue cleanup in the socket destructor to fix this.\n\nsyzkaller report:\n\nunreferenced object 0xffff8880117bfb80 (size 240):\n comm \"irq/56-vmw_vmci\", pid 205, jiffies 4295064448 (age 73.992s)\n hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n 78 dc 26 1e 80 88 ff ff 78 dc 26 1e 80 88 ff ff x.\u0026.....x.\u0026.....\n 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 da 26 1e 80 88 ff ff ..........\u0026.....\n backtrace:\n [\u003cffffffff82be8d97\u003e] __alloc_skb+0x287/0x330 net/core/skbuff.c:505\n [\u003cffffffffa114bcbd\u003e] vmci_transport_recv_dgram_cb+0xbd/0x210 [vmw_vsock_vmci_transport]\n [\u003cffffffffa05072c6\u003e] vmci_datagram_invoke_guest_handler+0x366/0x450 [vmw_vmci]\n [\u003cffffffffa050ad75\u003e] vmci_dispatch_dgs+0x235/0x490 [vmw_vmci]\n [\u003cffffffffa050b025\u003e] vmci_interrupt+0x55/0x290 [vmw_vmci]\n [\u003cffffffff8137ad2b\u003e] irq_thread_fn+0x8b/0x1a0 kernel/irq/manage.c:1205\n [\u003cffffffff8137c7ae\u003e] irq_thread+0x28e/0x530 kernel/irq/manage.c:1314\n [\u003cffffffff81253dd6\u003e] kthread+0x2e6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376\n [\u003cffffffff81004392\u003e] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295\n\nFound by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center\n(linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.",
"id": "GHSA-cf52-4qc8-h2h9",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98947"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f8e2b2045355a0ee2008125e573435504b13cee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4835dbcde5cc3ae37e0d0796052056b35fcae8bf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c24a4e87e219072e5e106f6791146cbf3b056b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9907db2b8e7ba70b442bb9dec86526a6511fac62"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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