{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sillytavern"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.18.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44652"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T22:24:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Resolution\n\nSillyTavern 1.18.0 added a generic server-side request filter (Private Request Whitelisting). Since we expect users to use the application in a trusted environment, the filter is disabled by default, however it is strongly advised to be enabled and properly configured when an instance is being hosted over a network, as suggested by a console warning message and an officially published security checklist for administrators.\n\nDocumentation: \n\n- https://docs.sillytavern.app/administration/config-yaml/#private-address-whitelisting\n- https://docs.sillytavern.app/administration/#security-checklist\n\n## Note on future SSRF findings\n\nSince the request filter applies to the entire application, no SSRF vulnerabilities against individual endpoints will be accepted, unless it has been proven that a properly configured and enabled filter can be bypassed in an undocumented way. Only advisories disclosed before the 1.18.0 release will be posted if their concern is SSRF.\n\n## Overview\n- Vulnerability Type: SSRF\n- Affected Location: `src/middleware/corsProxy.js:31`\n- Trigger Scenario: SSRF in optional CORS proxy\n\n## Root Cause\n`corsProxyMiddleware` forwards `req.params.url` directly into `fetch(url, ...)`. It only blocks circular requests to its own host and does not enforce destination allowlist or private/loopback restrictions, enabling SSRF.\n\n## Source-to-Sink Chain\n1. Source (user-controlled input)\n- Entry point: `GET /proxy/:url(*)`\n\n2. Data flow\n- Code analysis shows concrete propagation into this sink:\n  - vulnerability title: `SSRF in optional CORS proxy`\n  - sink location reached by attacker-controlled input: `src/middleware/corsProxy.js:31`\n- The same sink behavior is confirmed by controlled execution observations.\n\n3. Sink (dangerous operation)\n- Sink location: `src/middleware/corsProxy.js:31`\n- Vulnerable behavior: SSRF in optional CORS proxy\n\n## Exploitation Preconditions\n1. The attacker can control or influence a URL/endpoint parameter.\n2. The server can access internal or sensitive network targets.\n3. Outbound request validation or redirect controls are insufficient.\n\n## Risk\nThis issue can be used to pivot network access and reach unintended internal resources.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker may access internal network services or metadata endpoints and exfiltrate sensitive responses.\n\n## Remediation\n1. Enforce strict destination allowlist for proxy targets.\n2. Block loopback, link-local, RFC1918, and metadata address ranges.\n3. Apply the same destination validation to redirects.",
  "id": "GHSA-ccfq-2454-f5xw",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T22:24:05Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T22:24:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/security/advisories/GHSA-ccfq-2454-f5xw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SillyTavern/SillyTavern/releases/tag/1.18.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SillyTavern has a SSRF vulnerability in the CORS proxy middleware"
}