GHSA-C945-9H2G-HV7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 15:30 – Updated: 2026-09-14 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix potential panic dues to unprotected smc_llc_srv_add_link()
There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:
PID: 5900 TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/1:48" #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62 [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19] RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3 RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00 R8: 000000020a34ffff R9: ffff88c1350bbb20 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff88c1ab040a50 R15: ffff88c1ea281d00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc] #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc] #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]
The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link, smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to link group. This breaks the security environment protected by llc_conf_mutex.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-54237"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T13:16:12Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: fix potential panic dues to unprotected smc_llc_srv_add_link()\n\nThere is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:\n\nPID: 5900 TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: \"kworker/1:48\"\n #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7\n #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a\n #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60\n #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7\n #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715\n #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654\n #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62\n [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]\n RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3 RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38 RFLAGS: 00010202\n RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000004\n RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00 R8: 000000020a34ffff R9: ffff88c1350bbb20\n R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000\n R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff88c1ab040a50 R15: ffff88c1ea281d00\n ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018\n #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]\n #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]\n #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]\n\nThe reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,\nsmc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to\nlink group. This breaks the security environment protected by\nllc_conf_mutex.",
"id": "GHSA-c945-9h2g-hv7w",
"modified": "2026-09-14T12:31:27Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-54237"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c764cc271d3aa6528ae1b3394babf34ac01f775"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e40b801b3603a8f90b46acbacdea3505c27f01c0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2f46de98c11d41ac8d22765f47ba54ce5480a5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe35c24b730d38b421da93ac5d493cb4495e8e54"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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