GHSA-C7HJ-CC73-472R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: flush works in dependency order
virtio_vsock_remove() stops the virtqueues and then flushes each work item before freeing the enclosing virtio_vsock. The current order does not account for dependencies between those items: tx_work may queue send_pkt_work, and send_pkt_work may queue rx_work.
In particular, send_pkt_work can set restart_rx and release tx_lock. The remove path can then stop the queues and flush rx_work before send_pkt_work queues it. Although the later send_pkt_work flush waits for that producer to finish, nothing waits for the newly queued rx_work, so kfree(vsock) can race with it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888114c2b008 by task kworker/1:1/47 Workqueue: virtio_vsock virtio_transport_rx_work Call Trace: virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0 process_one_work+0x688/0x1120 worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 Allocated by task 1: virtio_vsock_probe+0xef/0x6b0 Freed by task 84: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 virtio_vsock_remove+0xd1/0x100
Flush the works in producer-to-consumer order. virtio_vsock_vqs_del() has already disabled the queue callbacks and cleared the run flags, so after tx_work and send_pkt_work are drained, no source remains that can queue rx_work after its flush.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80932"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:18:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock/virtio: flush works in dependency order\n\nvirtio_vsock_remove() stops the virtqueues and then flushes each work\nitem before freeing the enclosing virtio_vsock. The current order does\nnot account for dependencies between those items: tx_work may queue\nsend_pkt_work, and send_pkt_work may queue rx_work.\n\nIn particular, send_pkt_work can set restart_rx and release tx_lock.\nThe remove path can then stop the queues and flush rx_work before\nsend_pkt_work queues it. Although the later send_pkt_work flush waits\nfor that producer to finish, nothing waits for the newly queued rx_work,\nso kfree(vsock) can race with it.\n\nKASAN reported:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in\n virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888114c2b008 by task kworker/1:1/47\n Workqueue: virtio_vsock virtio_transport_rx_work\n Call Trace:\n virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0\n process_one_work+0x688/0x1120\n worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10\n Allocated by task 1:\n virtio_vsock_probe+0xef/0x6b0\n Freed by task 84:\n kfree+0x131/0x3c0\n virtio_vsock_remove+0xd1/0x100\n\nFlush the works in producer-to-consumer order. virtio_vsock_vqs_del()\nhas already disabled the queue callbacks and cleared the run flags, so\nafter tx_work and send_pkt_work are drained, no source remains that can\nqueue rx_work after its flush.",
"id": "GHSA-c7hj-cc73-472r",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80932"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/165a330a68b5f299d8735f0194c314cb2e571269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2187a56f2fd1715d54daed6392809223c60544f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/531e2ac2dab1ab90a16427c4f9c86663633e9487"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/728836ebca239810f164262b10211ef59182f811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9cb4e8ba71c9fbd935d66baa71bbb0b87192c94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da5e9f08714c19ba04e6863aca69d40f042f2e04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e059a14c1067bcc4f7b1947cd09f2baab98e340f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3313d952fc380cff53db9a28451a8807aa67b43"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.