GHSA-C7H5-Q22G-86GX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: drop incoming messages that cross network namespace boundaries
rds_find_bound() looks up the destination socket using a global rhashtable keyed solely on (addr, port, scope_id). Network namespaces are not part of the key, so a sender in netns A can deliver an incoming message (inc) to a socket that lives in a different netns B.
When this happens, inc->i_conn points to an rds_connection whose c_net is netns A, but the receiving rs lives in netns B. Once the child process that created netns A exits, cleanup_net() calls rds_loop_exit_net() -> rds_loop_kill_conns() -> rds_conn_destroy(), freeing that connection. If the survivor socket in netns B still holds the inc, any subsequent dereference of inc->i_conn is a use-after-free.
There are two dangerous sites in rds_clear_recv_queue(): 1. inc->i_conn->c_lcong (offset 88 of freed rds_connection, size 200) read via rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() -- confirmed by KASAN. 2. inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_free(inc) (function pointer at offset 80) called via rds_inc_put() when the inc refcount reaches zero -- same race window, potential call-through-freed-object primitive.
The bug is reachable from unprivileged user namespaces (CLONE_NEWUSER + CLONE_NEWNET), available since Linux 3.8.
Fix this by rejecting the delivery in rds_recv_incoming() when the socket returned by rds_find_bound() belongs to a different network namespace than the connection that carried the message. Use the existing rds_conn_net() / sock_net() helpers and net_eq() for the comparison.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrds: drop incoming messages that cross network namespace boundaries\n\nrds_find_bound() looks up the destination socket using a global\nrhashtable keyed solely on (addr, port, scope_id). Network namespaces\nare not part of the key, so a sender in netns A can deliver an incoming\nmessage (inc) to a socket that lives in a different netns B.\n\nWhen this happens, inc-\u003ei_conn points to an rds_connection whose c_net\nis netns A, but the receiving rs lives in netns B. Once the child\nprocess that created netns A exits, cleanup_net() calls\nrds_loop_exit_net() -\u003e rds_loop_kill_conns() -\u003e rds_conn_destroy(),\nfreeing that connection. If the survivor socket in netns B still holds\nthe inc, any subsequent dereference of inc-\u003ei_conn is a use-after-free.\n\nThere are two dangerous sites in rds_clear_recv_queue():\n 1. inc-\u003ei_conn-\u003ec_lcong (offset 88 of freed rds_connection, size 200)\n read via rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() -- confirmed by KASAN.\n 2. inc-\u003ei_conn-\u003ec_trans-\u003einc_free(inc) (function pointer at offset 80)\n called via rds_inc_put() when the inc refcount reaches zero -- same\n race window, potential call-through-freed-object primitive.\n\nThe bug is reachable from unprivileged user namespaces\n(CLONE_NEWUSER + CLONE_NEWNET), available since Linux 3.8.\n\nFix this by rejecting the delivery in rds_recv_incoming() when the\nsocket returned by rds_find_bound() belongs to a different network\nnamespace than the connection that carried the message. Use the\nexisting rds_conn_net() / sock_net() helpers and net_eq() for the\ncomparison.",
"id": "GHSA-c7h5-q22g-86gx",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03c574112e5d066df0ddce36d7438e850bcf3050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f8690e3869109cd5803ccb400889d20a0b54e0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e2e2d9806944fe485824d617c8b7c78116c22db"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5521ae71e32a8069ed4ca6e792179dc57bc43ab2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/742ff6f02545212e991cd8b45011e40d2c2ef25a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9591042533140dfe6608d9344806d567dcd39d02"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abff41fd928328bbf3dda1140beb2e61fa424ccd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfb3ce07b705e486e022a2f2b1242b48f13981ff"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.