GHSA-C784-4R38-57XW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-31 12:30 – Updated: 2026-06-02 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_alloc: prevent pcp corruption with SMP=n
The kernel test robot has reported:
BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kcompactd0/28 lock: 0xffff888807e35ef0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kcompactd0/28, .owner_cpu: 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-00127-ga06157804399 #1 PREEMPT 8cc09ef94dcec767faa911515ce9e609c45db470 Call Trace: __dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:95) dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) spin_dump (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:71) do_raw_spin_trylock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:?) _raw_spin_trylock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138) __free_frozen_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2973) ___free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5295) __free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5334) tlb_remove_table_rcu (include/linux/mm.h:? include/linux/mm.h:3122 include/asm-generic/tlb.h:220 mm/mmu_gather.c:227 mm/mmu_gather.c:290) ? __cfi_tlb_remove_table_rcu (mm/mmu_gather.c:289) ? rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:?) rcu_core (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2607 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861) rcu_core_si (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2879) handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623) __irq_exit_rcu (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 kernel/softirq.c:725) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:741) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052) RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194) free_pcppages_bulk (mm/page_alloc.c:1494) drain_pages_zone (include/linux/spinlock.h:391 mm/page_alloc.c:2632) __drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2731) drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2747) kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3115) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:465) ? __cfi_kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3166) ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255)
Matthew has analyzed the report and identified that in drain_page_zone() we are in a section protected by spin_lock(&pcp->lock) and then get an interrupt that attempts spin_trylock() on the same lock. The code is designed to work this way without disabling IRQs and occasionally fail the trylock with a fallback. However, the SMP=n spinlock implementation assumes spin_trylock() will always succeed, and thus it's normally a no-op. Here the enabled lock debugging catches the problem, but otherwise it could cause a corruption of the pcp structure.
The problem has been introduced by commit 574907741599 ("mm/page_alloc: leave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations"). The pcp locking scheme recognizes the need for disabling IRQs to prevent nesting spin_trylock() sections on SMP=n, but the need to prevent the nesting in spin_lock() has not been recognized. Fix it by introducing local wrappers that change the spin_lock() to spin_lock_iqsave() with SMP=n and use them in all places that do spin_lock(&pcp->lock).
[vbabka@suse.cz: add pcp_ prefix to the spin_lock_irqsave wrappers, per Steven]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-31T12:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/page_alloc: prevent pcp corruption with SMP=n\n\nThe kernel test robot has reported:\n\n BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kcompactd0/28\n lock: 0xffff888807e35ef0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kcompactd0/28, .owner_cpu: 0\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-00127-ga06157804399 #1 PREEMPT 8cc09ef94dcec767faa911515ce9e609c45db470\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n __dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:95)\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)\n dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130)\n spin_dump (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:71)\n do_raw_spin_trylock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:?)\n _raw_spin_trylock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138)\n __free_frozen_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2973)\n ___free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5295)\n __free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5334)\n tlb_remove_table_rcu (include/linux/mm.h:? include/linux/mm.h:3122 include/asm-generic/tlb.h:220 mm/mmu_gather.c:227 mm/mmu_gather.c:290)\n ? __cfi_tlb_remove_table_rcu (mm/mmu_gather.c:289)\n ? rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:?)\n rcu_core (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2607 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861)\n rcu_core_si (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2879)\n handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623)\n __irq_exit_rcu (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 kernel/softirq.c:725)\n irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:741)\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052)\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194)\n free_pcppages_bulk (mm/page_alloc.c:1494)\n drain_pages_zone (include/linux/spinlock.h:391 mm/page_alloc.c:2632)\n __drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2731)\n drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2747)\n kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3115)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:465)\n ? __cfi_kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3166)\n ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164)\n ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412)\n ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255)\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nMatthew has analyzed the report and identified that in drain_page_zone()\nwe are in a section protected by spin_lock(\u0026pcp-\u003elock) and then get an\ninterrupt that attempts spin_trylock() on the same lock. The code is\ndesigned to work this way without disabling IRQs and occasionally fail the\ntrylock with a fallback. However, the SMP=n spinlock implementation\nassumes spin_trylock() will always succeed, and thus it\u0027s normally a\nno-op. Here the enabled lock debugging catches the problem, but otherwise\nit could cause a corruption of the pcp structure.\n\nThe problem has been introduced by commit 574907741599 (\"mm/page_alloc:\nleave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations\"). The pcp locking scheme\nrecognizes the need for disabling IRQs to prevent nesting spin_trylock()\nsections on SMP=n, but the need to prevent the nesting in spin_lock() has\nnot been recognized. Fix it by introducing local wrappers that change the\nspin_lock() to spin_lock_iqsave() with SMP=n and use them in all places\nthat do spin_lock(\u0026pcp-\u003elock).\n\n[vbabka@suse.cz: add pcp_ prefix to the spin_lock_irqsave wrappers, per Steven]",
"id": "GHSA-c784-4r38-57xw",
"modified": "2026-06-02T15:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-01-31T12:30:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-253495.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/038a102535eb49e10e93eafac54352fcc5d78847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3098f8f7c7b0686c74827aec42a2c45e69801ff8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a04ff9cd816e7346fcc8126f00ed80481f6569d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68688fc4eab007834b4c2d740214423ba2a335a8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df63d31e9ae02e2f6cd96147779e4ed7cd0e75f6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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