GHSA-C6W6-57JJ-62VH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 00:04 – Updated: 2026-07-14 00:04
VLAI
Summary
Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation
Details

Summary

Kimai 2.56.0 contains an authenticated authorization bypass in the timesheet restart and duplicate workflows. After a user loses access to a project, the user can still derive a new timesheet from one of their historical entries and create a new record under that now-unauthorized project and activity combination.

This is a permission revocation bypass with persistent write impact. The issue affects both restart and duplicate, which trust ownership of an old timesheet more than the user's current access to the underlying project, activity, and customer.

Details

The issue affects the following operations:

  • PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/restart
  • PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/duplicate

The root cause is that authorization gives too much weight to the fact that the original timesheet belongs to the current user. In src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php, the *_own_timesheet branch is evaluated before team-based access checks.

The restart/duplicate capability check also verifies only object visibility, not whether the current user still has team-based access to the referenced objects.

In src/API/TimesheetController.php, the restart flow copies the historical project and activity into a new candidate timesheet.

The duplicate flow similarly clones the historical record and saves it.

In src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php, creation of a new running entry still relies on isGranted('start', $timesheet).

For historical entries that belong to the current user, this logic can still succeed through the *_own_timesheet branch even after project access has been revoked. As a result, normal creation pages correctly stop offering the revoked project, but restart and duplicate can still create new records under it.

The same weakness also affects the Web duplicate flow because the UI path ultimately calls the same save logic in src/Controller/TimesheetAbstractController.php:

A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.

Impact

This vulnerability allows a user to keep writing new time entries into a project after project access has been revoked. That undermines administrative access-control changes and can pollute project time tracking, budget calculations, statistics, reports, and invoicing workflows.

Because both restart and duplicate can reuse historical project/activity bindings, old timesheet records effectively become reusable capability tokens that survive later access-control changes. This is not a UI artifact or a caching problem: new database rows are persisted after revocation.

Solution

The metoid TimesheetVoter::canStart() now checks team access for project and activity. This verification is used for new timesheets and also for the duplication and restart workflows.

See https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-c6w6-57jj-62vh for more information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.57.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "kimai/kimai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.58.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52822"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T00:04:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nKimai 2.56.0 contains an authenticated authorization bypass in the timesheet `restart` and `duplicate` workflows. After a user loses access to a project, the user can still derive a new timesheet from one of their historical entries and create a new record under that now-unauthorized project and activity combination.\n\nThis is a permission revocation bypass with persistent write impact. The issue affects both `restart` and `duplicate`, which trust ownership of an old timesheet more than the user\u0027s current access to the underlying project, activity, and customer.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue affects the following operations:\n\n- `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/restart`\n- `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}/duplicate`\n\nThe root cause is that authorization gives too much weight to the fact that the original timesheet belongs to the current user. In `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php`, the `*_own_timesheet` branch is evaluated before team-based access checks.\n\nThe restart/duplicate capability check also verifies only object visibility, not whether the current user still has team-based access to the referenced objects. \n\nIn `src/API/TimesheetController.php`, the restart flow copies the historical `project` and `activity` into a new candidate timesheet.\n\nThe duplicate flow similarly clones the historical record and saves it.\n\nIn `src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php`, creation of a new running entry still relies on `isGranted(\u0027start\u0027, $timesheet)`.\n\nFor historical entries that belong to the current user, this logic can still succeed through the `*_own_timesheet` branch even after project access has been revoked. As a result, normal creation pages correctly stop offering the revoked project, but `restart` and `duplicate` can still create new records under it.\n\nThe same weakness also affects the Web duplicate flow because the UI path ultimately calls the same save logic in `src/Controller/TimesheetAbstractController.php`:\n\n*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows a user to keep writing new time entries into a project after project access has been revoked. That undermines administrative access-control changes and can pollute project time tracking, budget calculations, statistics, reports, and invoicing workflows.\n\nBecause both `restart` and `duplicate` can reuse historical project/activity bindings, old timesheet records effectively become reusable capability tokens that survive later access-control changes. This is not a UI artifact or a caching problem: new database rows are persisted after revocation.\n\n# Solution\n\nThe metoid `TimesheetVoter::canStart()` now checks team access for project and activity. This verification is used for new timesheets and also for the `duplication` and `restart` workflows.\n\nSee [https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-c6w6-57jj-62vh](https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-c6w6-57jj-62vh) for more information.",
  "id": "GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh",
  "modified": "2026-07-14T00:04:26Z",
  "published": "2026-07-14T00:04:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-c6w6-57jj-62vh"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improper Authorization in Kimai Timesheet Restart and Duplicate Allows New Timesheets After Project Access Revocation"
}



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