GHSA-C66C-VQ6W-FVH5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 15:25 – Updated: 2026-06-05 15:25
VLAI
Summary
Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic
Details

Summary

managementServer.CreateSchematic (internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go) passes the caller-controlled TalosVersion field directly to imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions, which embeds it verbatim into a fmt.Sprintf("/version/%s/overlays/official", talosVersion) path template. url.URL.JoinPath resolves any ../ sequences in that path, allowing an authenticated Operator to rewrite the URL path and force Omni to issue HTTP GET requests to unintended paths on the configured image-factory server. Error body content from those unintended endpoints is returned to the caller.

Severity

  • Attack Vector: Network: exploited via the gRPC CreateSchematic API endpoint.
  • Attack Complexity: Low: once the attacker holds an Operator credential and has identified a media ID with an overlay, exploitation is a single API call.
  • Privileges Required: High: role.Operator is required, which has administrative capabilities on Omni.
  • User Interaction: None.
  • Scope: Unchanged: the traversal is constrained to the configured image-factory host; the attacker cannot redirect Omni to an arbitrary external server.
  • Confidentiality Impact: Low: error body content from unintended image-factory endpoints is reflected back to the operator, potentially leaking server-internal information.
  • Integrity Impact: None: only HTTP GET requests are issued; no write operations are performed.
  • Availability Impact: None.

Impact

  • Same-host path traversal: An authenticated Operator can force Omni to issue GET requests to arbitrary URL paths on the configured image-factory server, bypassing the intended versioned overlay API structure.
  • Error-body disclosure: HTTP error responses from unintended image-factory endpoints are reflected back to the operator, potentially leaking server-internal diagnostics or sensitive path content.
  • Internal network probing: In deployments using a private image-factory instance on an internal network, the attacker can probe endpoint existence and partial responses through error-text differences.
  • Depth control: By varying the number of ../ prefixes in talosVersion, the attacker can reach any path hierarchy on the image-factory host.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siderolabs/omni"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45723"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T15:25:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`managementServer.CreateSchematic` (`internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go`) passes the caller-controlled `TalosVersion` field directly to `imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions`, which embeds it verbatim into a `fmt.Sprintf(\"/version/%s/overlays/official\", talosVersion)` path template. `url.URL.JoinPath` resolves any `../` sequences in that path, allowing an authenticated Operator to rewrite the URL path and force Omni to issue HTTP GET requests to unintended paths on the configured image-factory server. Error body content from those unintended endpoints is returned to the caller.\n\n## Severity\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network: exploited via the gRPC `CreateSchematic` API endpoint.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low: once the attacker holds an Operator credential and has identified a media ID with an overlay, exploitation is a single API call.\n- **Privileges Required:** High: `role.Operator` is required, which has administrative capabilities on Omni.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged: the traversal is constrained to the configured image-factory host; the attacker cannot redirect Omni to an arbitrary external server.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** Low: error body content from unintended image-factory endpoints is reflected back to the operator, potentially leaking server-internal information.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None: only HTTP GET requests are issued; no write operations are performed.\n- **Availability Impact:** None.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Same-host path traversal**: An authenticated Operator can force Omni to issue GET requests to arbitrary URL paths on the configured image-factory server, bypassing the intended versioned overlay API structure.\n- **Error-body disclosure**: HTTP error responses from unintended image-factory endpoints are reflected back to the operator, potentially leaking server-internal diagnostics or sensitive path content.\n- **Internal network probing**: In deployments using a private image-factory instance on an internal network, the attacker can probe endpoint existence and partial responses through error-text differences.\n- **Depth control**: By varying the number of `../` prefixes in `talosVersion`, the attacker can reach any path hierarchy on the image-factory host.\n\n## Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "id": "GHSA-c66c-vq6w-fvh5",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T15:25:58Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T15:25:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/security/advisories/GHSA-c66c-vq6w-fvh5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/releases/tag/v1.6.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siderolabs/omni/releases/tag/v1.7.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…