GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-C5W7-7J2G-7V27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-15 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

kernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook

After commit 12e9e3cd03b5 ("simpe_xattr: use per-sb cache"), kernfs_xattr_set() and kernfs_xattr_get() compute the cache via kernfs_root(kn) before any other check. kernfs_root(kn) walks kn->__parent first and falls back to kn->dir.root, both of which are NULL on a freshly kmem_cache_zalloc()'d kn. kn->__parent was being set in kernfs_new_node() after __kernfs_new_node() returned, and kn->dir.root is set even later by kernfs_create_dir_ns() / kernfs_create_empty_dir().

The LSM kernfs_init_security hook is invoked from inside __kernfs_new_node(), before either field has been initialized. selinux_kernfs_init_security() ends with kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ...). kernfs_root(kn) then returns NULL, and &((struct kernfs_root *)NULL)->xa_cache evaluates to offsetof(struct kernfs_root, xa_cache) which faults:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0 RIP: 0010:simple_xattr_set+0x27/0x8b0 Call Trace: kernfs_xattr_set+0x63/0xb0 selinux_kernfs_init_security+0x13b/0x270 security_kernfs_init_security+0x36/0xc0 __kernfs_new_node+0x182/0x290 kernfs_new_node+0x80/0xc0 kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x2b/0xa0 cgroup_create+0x116/0x380 cgroup_mkdir+0x7c/0x1a0

Reproduces deterministically at PID 1 (systemd) on an SELinux-enabled distro. The first cgroup mkdir under /sys/fs/cgroup with a labelled parent panics the kernel.

The LSM hook's contract is that the kn_dir argument is the parent of the new kn, so kn->__parent should already point at kn_dir when the hook runs. Move kernfs_get(parent) and rcu_assign_pointer of kn->__parent from kernfs_new_node() into __kernfs_new_node() right before the security hook, and unwind the parent reference on the err_out4 path. kernfs_root(kn) then takes its parent branch during the hook and returns parent->dir.root, which is the correct root.

This also closes the same-shape latent bug in kernfs_xattr_get() (which today is hidden only by kernfs_iattrs_noalloc() returning NULL on a fresh kn).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-74342"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:35Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkernfs: link kn to its parent before the LSM init hook\n\nAfter commit 12e9e3cd03b5 (\"simpe_xattr: use per-sb cache\"),\nkernfs_xattr_set() and kernfs_xattr_get() compute the cache via\nkernfs_root(kn) before any other check.  kernfs_root(kn) walks\nkn-\u003e__parent first and falls back to kn-\u003edir.root, both of which are\nNULL on a freshly kmem_cache_zalloc()\u0027d kn. kn-\u003e__parent was being set\nin kernfs_new_node() after __kernfs_new_node() returned, and kn-\u003edir.root\nis set even later by kernfs_create_dir_ns() / kernfs_create_empty_dir().\n\nThe LSM kernfs_init_security hook is invoked from inside\n__kernfs_new_node(), before either field has been initialized.\nselinux_kernfs_init_security() ends with kernfs_xattr_set(kn,\nXATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ...).  kernfs_root(kn) then returns NULL, and\n\u0026((struct kernfs_root *)NULL)-\u003exa_cache evaluates to\noffsetof(struct kernfs_root, xa_cache) which faults:\n\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000e0\n  RIP: 0010:simple_xattr_set+0x27/0x8b0\n  Call Trace:\n   kernfs_xattr_set+0x63/0xb0\n   selinux_kernfs_init_security+0x13b/0x270\n   security_kernfs_init_security+0x36/0xc0\n   __kernfs_new_node+0x182/0x290\n   kernfs_new_node+0x80/0xc0\n   kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x2b/0xa0\n   cgroup_create+0x116/0x380\n   cgroup_mkdir+0x7c/0x1a0\n\nReproduces deterministically at PID 1 (systemd) on an SELinux-enabled\ndistro. The first cgroup mkdir under /sys/fs/cgroup with a labelled\nparent panics the kernel.\n\nThe LSM hook\u0027s contract is that the kn_dir argument is the parent of\nthe new kn, so kn-\u003e__parent should already point at kn_dir when the\nhook runs.  Move kernfs_get(parent) and rcu_assign_pointer of\nkn-\u003e__parent from kernfs_new_node() into __kernfs_new_node() right\nbefore the security hook, and unwind the parent reference on the\nerr_out4 path.  kernfs_root(kn) then takes its parent branch during\nthe hook and returns parent-\u003edir.root, which is the correct root.\n\nThis also closes the same-shape latent bug in kernfs_xattr_get() (which\ntoday is hidden only by kernfs_iattrs_noalloc() returning NULL on a\nfresh kn).",
  "id": "GHSA-c5w7-7j2g-7v27",
  "modified": "2026-08-15T06:32:30Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74342"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/319b82e8b46edaf557436ad858e734e583f78ec9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cccc49b027c7551ffc1d2532f2ef1922661f3da"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…