GHSA-C5M8-Q98X-42WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-28 18:32MIME::Head versions from 5.518 before 5.521 for Perl decode a partly encoded multipart boundary without flagging the parse as ambiguous.
The multipart_boundary() method decodes RFC 2047 encoded words anywhere in the boundary, but the ambiguity check only fires when the whole value is one encoded word. A boundary such as abc=?us-ascii?Q?def?= is used as abcdef, and ambiguous_content() returns false.
Encoded words are not allowed in parameters, so other mail readers split the message on the literal value. A remote sender can hide an attachment from a filter that relies on ambiguous_content() while the recipient's mail client shows it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-436"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T18:17:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "MIME::Head versions from 5.518 before 5.521 for Perl decode a partly encoded multipart boundary without flagging the parse as ambiguous.\n\nThe multipart_boundary() method decodes RFC 2047 encoded words anywhere in the boundary, but the ambiguity check only fires when the whole value is one encoded word. A boundary such as abc=?us-ascii?Q?def?= is used as abcdef, and ambiguous_content() returns false.\n\nEncoded words are not allowed in parameters, so other mail readers split the message on the literal value. A remote sender can hide an attachment from a filter that relies on ambiguous_content() while the recipient\u0027s mail client shows it.",
"id": "GHSA-c5m8-q98x-42wx",
"modified": "2026-10-28T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T18:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/DSKOLL/MIME-tools-5.521/changes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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