GHSA-C5F6-CP2C-VCQC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Quiesce response IRQ before freeing request queue

qla2xxx_delete_qpair() deletes the request queue before the response queue. qla25xx_delete_req_que() frees the request queue memory (kfree(req) in qla25xx_free_req_que()), but the response-queue MSI-X is only released later, in qla25xx_free_rsp_que(). In that window the response interrupt can still fire, qla2xxx_msix_rsp_q() queues qpair->q_work, and qla_do_work() -> qla24xx_process_response_queue() dereferences the now-freed rsp->req (LOGINOUT/CT/ELS entries and the status path), a use-after-free.

The cancel_work_sync() added for the qpair teardown lives in the response free path, which runs after the request queue is already freed, so it does not protect rsp->req.

Release the response-queue interrupt and flush qpair->q_work before deleting the request queue, so no late completion can reach the freed request queue. Clearing have_irq makes the subsequent qla25xx_free_rsp_que() skip its free_irq(), and the firmware queue-delete order (request then response) is preserved; the request-delete mailbox completes on the default vector and is unaffected by dropping the qpair response interrupt early.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89848"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Quiesce response IRQ before freeing request queue\n\nqla2xxx_delete_qpair() deletes the request queue before the response\nqueue. qla25xx_delete_req_que() frees the request queue memory\n(kfree(req) in qla25xx_free_req_que()), but the response-queue MSI-X is\nonly released later, in qla25xx_free_rsp_que(). In that window the\nresponse interrupt can still fire, qla2xxx_msix_rsp_q() queues\nqpair-\u003eq_work, and qla_do_work() -\u003e qla24xx_process_response_queue()\ndereferences the now-freed rsp-\u003ereq (LOGINOUT/CT/ELS entries and the\nstatus path), a use-after-free.\n\nThe cancel_work_sync() added for the qpair teardown lives in the\nresponse free path, which runs after the request queue is already freed,\nso it does not protect rsp-\u003ereq.\n\nRelease the response-queue interrupt and flush qpair-\u003eq_work before\ndeleting the request queue, so no late completion can reach the freed\nrequest queue. Clearing have_irq makes the subsequent\nqla25xx_free_rsp_que() skip its free_irq(), and the firmware\nqueue-delete order (request then response) is preserved; the\nrequest-delete mailbox completes on the default vector and is unaffected\nby dropping the qpair response interrupt early.",
  "id": "GHSA-c5f6-cp2c-vcqc",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:29Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a005dcc5e9bf7b31a45422b10f2765b25161389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10e9f05f7fd0a103886a867ec8afe621fe4b906a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1486cc18be3e2b4c2a730f4a1b0448d009381b3d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/157ca7d1af45f87aa14a286754f19c3f72386988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/505753ec2594c6af09a601f0dd60be7d840c1d2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/730a18768b27582636b5af343069c30809b763a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ac5be2a8609679fc6bbfea881360444a5ce8202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be68aef64ab2e633867c4ac946d16644c306fc3d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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