GHSA-C534-2W9C-X7FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:47 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:47Summary
Kite versions 0.6.9 through 0.14.0 authorize Kubernetes proxy requests against the pod or service identified by the original route parameters. Encoded path traversal segments can cause the upstream URL to resolve to a different Kubernetes API endpoint after authorization.
Impact
An authenticated user with get permission on pods or services in one namespace can cause Kite to issue GET requests to Kubernetes API endpoints outside that namespace using Kite's service account.
With Kite's default Helm RBAC configuration, this allows cluster-wide resource disclosure, including Secrets. The validated impact is confidentiality only; resource modification and denial of service were not demonstrated.
Deployments using a restricted Kite service account are affected only up to the permissions granted to that service account.
Technical details
The authorization check is performed against the original namespace and kind route parameters. The proxy path is subsequently decoded and passed to url.JoinPath, which resolves .. segments and can produce an upstream URL outside the authorized pod or service proxy prefix.
Two input locations were affected:
- Encoded traversal segments in the proxy catch-all path.
- Encoded traversal and slash characters in the resource name.
Reproduction
- Create a user with a role granting only
pods:getin namespacedefault. - Create any pod in
default(e.g.nginx). - Send the following request (auth cookie required):
curl --path-as-is --cookie "auth_token=<JWT>" \
'http://<kite-host>/api/v1/_clusters/<cluster>/namespaces/default/pods/nginx/proxy/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/kube-system/secrets'
Patches
Fixed in Kite 0.14.1.
- https://github.com/kite-org/kite/releases/tag/v0.14.1
Workarounds
Upgrade to 0.14.1 or later.
If upgrading is temporarily impossible, reject encoded dot segments and encoded slashes at the reverse proxy and restrict Kite's Kubernetes service account permissions. Reverse-proxy normalization should not be treated as a permanent fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.14.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/zxh326/kite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.9"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-647"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:47:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nKite versions 0.6.9 through 0.14.0 authorize Kubernetes proxy requests against the pod or service identified by the original route parameters. Encoded path traversal segments can cause the upstream URL to resolve to a different Kubernetes API endpoint after authorization.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with `get` permission on pods or services in one namespace can cause Kite to issue GET requests to Kubernetes API endpoints outside that namespace using Kite\u0027s service account.\n\nWith Kite\u0027s default Helm RBAC configuration, this allows cluster-wide resource disclosure, including Secrets. The validated impact is confidentiality only; resource modification and denial of service were not demonstrated.\n\nDeployments using a restricted Kite service account are affected only up to the permissions granted to that service account.\n\n## Technical details\n\nThe authorization check is performed against the original namespace and kind route parameters. The proxy path is subsequently decoded and passed to `url.JoinPath`, which resolves `..` segments and can produce an upstream URL outside the authorized pod or service proxy prefix.\n\nTwo input locations were affected:\n\n1. Encoded traversal segments in the proxy catch-all path.\n2. Encoded traversal and slash characters in the resource name.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n\n1. Create a user with a role granting only `pods:get` in namespace `default`.\n2. Create any pod in `default` (e.g. `nginx`).\n3. Send the following request (auth cookie required):\n\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is --cookie \"auth_token=\u003cJWT\u003e\" \\\n \u0027http://\u003ckite-host\u003e/api/v1/_clusters/\u003ccluster\u003e/namespaces/default/pods/nginx/proxy/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/kube-system/secrets\u0027\n```\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in Kite 0.14.1.\n\n- https://github.com/kite-org/kite/releases/tag/v0.14.1\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 0.14.1 or later.\n\nIf upgrading is temporarily impossible, reject encoded dot segments and encoded slashes at the reverse proxy and restrict Kite\u0027s Kubernetes service account permissions. Reverse-proxy normalization should not be treated as a permanent fix.",
"id": "GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm",
"modified": "2026-07-24T21:47:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T21:47:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite/security/advisories/GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite/pull/638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite/commit/08116eed557f8d6982cc83af0b02991e0f3577d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite/commit/69ad938937af8f375a2e183d1a331926ab851d98"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kite-org/kite/releases/tag/v0.14.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kite Kubernetes proxy path traversal allows authenticated users to bypass RBAC and read cluster-wide resources"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.