GHSA-C49C-GFWF-M45V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: bound POSIX lock data area by response length
CIFSSMBPosixLock() receives a TRANS2 response whose server-provided DataOffset and DataCount are not required by validate_t2() to describe an interval inside the response. A server can therefore make the client read a cifs_posix_lock beyond the response buffer and return those kernel bytes through F_GETLK.
Use smbCalcSize() to obtain the full response length after any multipart TRANS2 reassembly, then reject data areas that extend past it before dereferencing them.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:50Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: bound POSIX lock data area by response length\n\nCIFSSMBPosixLock() receives a TRANS2 response whose server-provided\nDataOffset and DataCount are not required by validate_t2() to describe an\ninterval inside the response. A server can therefore make the client read a\ncifs_posix_lock beyond the response buffer and return those kernel bytes\nthrough F_GETLK.\n\nUse smbCalcSize() to obtain the full response length after any multipart\nTRANS2 reassembly, then reject data areas that extend past it before\ndereferencing them.",
"id": "GHSA-c49c-gfwf-m45v",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/659148924f05cfc453cca39b885d76b25b84cc29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fc9af68c57156ff64769f30e831553cd03b3000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b75ba374fe03e3650d86fe9cf7fcec117389516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5993c6146ad74a3dab2d9cbd09106d644d761cb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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