GHSA-C3HX-25RR-8X92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix missing alloc tagging of direct mempool allocations
Commit 1d78d56c43ef ("netfs: Fix folio_queue ENOMEM in writeback by adding a mempool") added a mempool for the folio_queues and made the request, subrequest and folio_queue allocations distinguish between writeback and everything else. Writeback is part of memory reclaim and must not fail due to ENOMEM, so it allocates under GFP_NOFS through mempool_alloc(), which may dip into the pool's reserve and, if that runs empty, wait for elements to be returned. The GFP_KERNEL paths, which can return -ENOMEM to their callers, invoke the pool's ->alloc() callback directly instead.
The direct call, however, skips the alloc_hooks() wrapper that the mempool_alloc() macro provides. The pool callbacks, mempool_alloc_slab() and mempool_kmalloc(), call kmem_cache_alloc_noprof() and kmalloc_noprof() and rely on current->alloc_tag having been set by the caller. With CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=y this leads to
current->alloc_tag not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:161 at __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook
alloc_tag was not set
WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:166 at __alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook
at allocation and free time respectively, as reported when reading files on a CIFS mount. The allocations are also missing from /proc/allocinfo.
Wrap the direct ->alloc() invocations in alloc_hooks() with a new mempool_alloc_noreserve() helper in include/linux/mempool.h, next to the other alloc_hooks()-wrapped macros such as mempool_alloc(). The GFP_KERNEL paths keep their failable allocation semantics, they just get tagged now.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfs: Fix missing alloc tagging of direct mempool allocations\n\nCommit 1d78d56c43ef (\"netfs: Fix folio_queue ENOMEM in writeback by\nadding a mempool\") added a mempool for the folio_queues and made the\nrequest, subrequest and folio_queue allocations distinguish between\nwriteback and everything else. Writeback is part of memory reclaim\nand must not fail due to ENOMEM, so it allocates under GFP_NOFS\nthrough mempool_alloc(), which may dip into the pool\u0027s reserve and,\nif that runs empty, wait for elements to be returned. The\nGFP_KERNEL paths, which can return -ENOMEM to their callers, invoke\nthe pool\u0027s -\u003ealloc() callback directly instead.\n\nThe direct call, however, skips the alloc_hooks() wrapper that the\nmempool_alloc() macro provides. The pool callbacks, mempool_alloc_slab()\nand mempool_kmalloc(), call kmem_cache_alloc_noprof() and kmalloc_noprof()\nand rely on current-\u003ealloc_tag having been set by the caller. With\nCONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=y this leads to\n\n current-\u003ealloc_tag not set\n WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:161 at __alloc_tagging_slab_alloc_hook\n alloc_tag was not set\n WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:166 at __alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook\n\nat allocation and free time respectively, as reported when reading\nfiles on a CIFS mount. The allocations are also missing from\n/proc/allocinfo.\n\nWrap the direct -\u003ealloc() invocations in alloc_hooks() with a new\nmempool_alloc_noreserve() helper in include/linux/mempool.h, next to\nthe other alloc_hooks()-wrapped macros such as mempool_alloc(). The\nGFP_KERNEL paths keep their failable allocation semantics, they just\nget tagged now.",
"id": "GHSA-c3hx-25rr-8x92",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37a2042748bc880df03ff8315db86ed82991fbb8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c03da745171485fd181f17b69213464f6d05f3d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b78b728e21c32ec4c330b299f657fb1eb02dffc2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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