Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-C2JQ-9MFV-9WQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-24 15:32

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation

Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A.

Thread A Thread B Thread C

down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write()

This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99059"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation\n\nTwo threads begin processing the identical response message, received\ntwice. The first thread, A, runs. While it\u0027s running, the second one,\nB, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while\nblocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake\ninitiation that\u0027s already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself\ntakes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation\nsucceeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls\nup_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished\nits calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread\nB then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session,\nusing that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A.\n\nThread A\t\t\tThread B\t\t\tThread C\n\ndown_read()\n sA = handshake-\u003estate\n memcpy(cA, handshake-\u003ecrypto)\nup_read()\nif (sA != 1)\n goto fail\nslow_crypto(cA)\n\t\t\t\tdown_read()\n\t\t\t\t sB = handshake-\u003estate\n\t\t\t\t memcpy(cB, handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\tup_read()\n\t\t\t\tif (sB != 1)\n\t\t\t\t goto fail\n\t\t\t\tslow_crypto(cB)\ndown_write()\n if (sA != handshake-\u003estate)\n  goto fail\n memcpy(handshake-\u003ecrypto, cA)\n handshake-\u003estate = 2\nup_write()\ndown_write()\n if (handshake-\u003estate != 2)\n  goto fail\n derive_session(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\nup_write()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t slow_crypto(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t handshake-\u003estate = 1\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t if (sB != handshake-\u003estate)\n\t\t\t\t   goto fail\n\t\t\t\t memcpy(handshake-\u003ecrypto, cB)\n\t\t\t\t handshake-\u003estate = 2\n\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t if (handshake-\u003estate != 2)\n\t\t\t\t  goto fail\n\t\t\t\t derive_session(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\nThis seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice,\nbut ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral\nprivate key that\u0027s on the stack with the latest one that the peer\u0027s\nhandshake state has.",
  "id": "GHSA-c2jq-9mfv-9wqh",
  "modified": "2026-10-24T15:32:51Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T15:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99059"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-99059 (GCVE-0-2026-99059)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 12:22 – Updated: 2026-10-24 14:10

Title

wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 7067 records in the last 180 days details

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa7861…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd16…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d900295562…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd , < fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295 (git) Affected: e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd , < c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04 (git) Affected: e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd , < 4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a (git) Affected: e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd , < 3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20 (git) Affected: e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd , < d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 5.6 Unaffected: 0 , < 5.6 (semver) Unaffected: 6.6.160 , ≤ 6.6.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.113 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.57 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.11 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "e7096c131e5161fa3b8e52a650d7719d2857adfd",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.6"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.6",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.113",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.57",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.11",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.6.160",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.113",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.57",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.11",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "5.6",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation\n\nTwo threads begin processing the identical response message, received\ntwice. The first thread, A, runs. While it\u0027s running, the second one,\nB, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while\nblocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake\ninitiation that\u0027s already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself\ntakes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation\nsucceeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls\nup_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished\nits calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread\nB then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session,\nusing that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A.\n\nThread A\t\t\tThread B\t\t\tThread C\n\ndown_read()\n sA = handshake-\u003estate\n memcpy(cA, handshake-\u003ecrypto)\nup_read()\nif (sA != 1)\n goto fail\nslow_crypto(cA)\n\t\t\t\tdown_read()\n\t\t\t\t sB = handshake-\u003estate\n\t\t\t\t memcpy(cB, handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\tup_read()\n\t\t\t\tif (sB != 1)\n\t\t\t\t goto fail\n\t\t\t\tslow_crypto(cB)\ndown_write()\n if (sA != handshake-\u003estate)\n  goto fail\n memcpy(handshake-\u003ecrypto, cA)\n handshake-\u003estate = 2\nup_write()\ndown_write()\n if (handshake-\u003estate != 2)\n  goto fail\n derive_session(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\nup_write()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t slow_crypto(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t handshake-\u003estate = 1\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t if (sB != handshake-\u003estate)\n\t\t\t\t   goto fail\n\t\t\t\t memcpy(handshake-\u003ecrypto, cB)\n\t\t\t\t handshake-\u003estate = 2\n\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\t\t\t\tdown_write()\n\t\t\t\t if (handshake-\u003estate != 2)\n\t\t\t\t  goto fail\n\t\t\t\t derive_session(handshake-\u003ecrypto)\n\t\t\t\tup_write()\n\nThis seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice,\nbut ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral\nprivate key that\u0027s on the stack with the latest one that the peer\u0027s\nhandshake state has."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:N - An IPv4/IPv6 UDP MESSAGE_HANDSHAKE_RESPONSE follows wg_receive() -\u003e wg_packet_receive() -\u003e wg_packet_handshake_receive_worker() -\u003e wg_receive_handshake_packet() -\u003e patched wg_noise_handshake_consume_response(); replayed response bytes drive the race over a routable WireGuard endpoint.\nAC:H - Success requires responses A and B to snapshot the same initiation while a jittered retransmission has queued C, followed by the exact A-to-C-to-B write-lock ordering. The random REKEY_TIMEOUT jitter and host worker scheduling are not controlled by the attacker.\nPR:N - A byte-identical captured response passes wg_cookie_validate_packet() and the encrypted_nothing check in message_decrypt() when replayed, so an on-path attacker need not possess a configured peer\u0027s private or preshared key.\nUI:N - The attacker delays and duplicates the UDP response, while wg_expired_retransmit_handshake() automatically queues the intermediate initiation; no victim action is required during exploitation.\nS:U - The duplicate sessions remain within the same peer\u0027s noise_keypairs and compromise traffic handled by that WireGuard device under the same kernel security authority; no VM, IOMMU, or other authority boundary is crossed.\nC:H - Both calls to wg_noise_handshake_begin_session() run derive_keys() on the same chaining_key, while each keypair_create() starts sending_counter at zero. Reusing ChaCha20 keys and nonces across transport packets can expose substantial tunnel plaintext.\nI:H - encrypt_packet() authenticates transport ciphertext with ChaCha20-Poly1305 using the duplicated key and reset counter as its nonce. Reusing that Poly1305 one-time key permits an on-path attacker to construct forged authenticated tunnel packets for colliding counters.\nA:L - The reset sending_counter repeats counters already used by the first session, so the peer\u0027s counter_validate() replay window discards colliding packets until the new counter catches up or a rekey occurs. This interrupts tunnel traffic but does not corrupt memory or crash the kernel."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:16.832Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e"
        }
      ],
      "title": "wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-99059",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-23T12:22:47.559Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.388Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-24T14:10:16.832Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted