GHSA-9XJQ-2VRW-4465
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 15:31 – Updated: 2025-01-15 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context
This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs like the bellow:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2 preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070: #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915 CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline] hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline] hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T13:15:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_core: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context\n\nThis reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs\nlike the bellow:\n\nBUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585\nin_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2\npreempt_count: 0, expected: 0\nRCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0\n4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:\n #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]\n #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335\n #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(\u0026hdev-\u003erx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]\n #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(\u0026hdev-\u003erx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335\n #2: ffff8880665d0078 (\u0026hdev-\u003elock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914\n #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]\n #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]\n #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915\nCPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024\nWorkqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114\n __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187\n __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]\n __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752\n hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]\n hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939\n hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]\n hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569\n hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335\n worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416\n kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-9xjq-2vrw-4465",
"modified": "2025-01-15T15:31:25Z",
"published": "2025-01-15T15:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/028a68886ead0764f4b26adfcaebf9f1955e76ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a31c018bfe4de84c0741aadd2c913a2490b186d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d94f05558271654670d18c26c912da0c1c15549"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bef333418368c58690b501894324c09124e4614f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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