Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9X9P-QF8F-MVJG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:28 – Updated: 2026-05-27 00:28

Summary

LiquidJS's `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`

Details

Summary

Context.spawn() in liquidjs creates a child Context for the {% render %} tag but does not propagate the parent context's resolved ownPropertyOnly value. The new context re-derives ownPropertyOnly from opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), silently discarding any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override that was supplied to parseAndRender(). As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible ownPropertyOnly:false and then locks down an untrusted render with parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any {% render %} partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (where, reject, group_by, find, find_index, has) — the underlying root cause in Context.spawn() is shared, but {% render %} is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage.

Details

The bug is in Context.spawn():

// src/context/context.ts:105-114
public spawn (scope = {}) {
  return new Context(scope, this.opts, {
    sync: this.sync,
    globals: this.globals,
    strictVariables: this.strictVariables
    // <-- ownPropertyOnly is missing here
  }, {
    renderLimit: this.renderLimit,
    memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit
  })
}

The constructor resolves ownPropertyOnly as:

// src/context/context.ts:47
this.ownPropertyOnly = renderOptions.ownPropertyOnly ?? opts.ownPropertyOnly

Because spawn() passes a RenderOptions object with no ownPropertyOnly, the child context falls back to opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), throwing away any per-render override that the parent context had applied. this.opts is the raw normalized instance options object; it is not mutated to reflect render-time overrides.

The {% render %} tag at src/tags/render.ts:51-77 calls spawn() to build the partial's isolated scope:

* render (ctx: Context, emitter: Emitter): Generator<unknown, void, unknown> {
  const { liquid, hash } = this
  const filepath = (yield renderFilePath(this['file'], ctx, liquid)) as string
  assert(filepath, () => `illegal file path "${filepath}"`)

  const childCtx = ctx.spawn()                    // <-- ownPropertyOnly lost here
  const scope = childCtx.bottom()
  __assign(scope, yield hash.render(ctx))
  ...
  const templates = (yield liquid._parsePartialFile(filepath, childCtx.sync, this['currentFile'])) as Template[]
  yield liquid.renderer.renderTemplates(templates, childCtx, emitter)
}

All template variable lookups inside the partial then go through childCtx.readProperty() (src/context/context.ts:123-135), which calls readJSProperty(obj, key, this.ownPropertyOnly). With childCtx.ownPropertyOnly === false (inherited from opts), the protective check at src/context/context.ts:138-141 is skipped and prototype-chain properties are returned to the template:

export function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) {
  if (ownPropertyOnly && !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) && !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined
  return obj[key]
}

The {% include %} tag is not affected: it does not call spawn(); it pushes onto the parent context's scope stack (src/tags/include.ts:40), so the parent's resolved ownPropertyOnly continues to apply.

Trust model / why this matters: RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly is documented (src/liquid-options.ts:108-111) as "Same as ownPropertyOnly on LiquidOptions, but only for current render() call". It exists precisely so that developers running a non-strict instance can lock down individual untrusted renders. That contract is broken — the override is silently dropped at every partial boundary.

PoC

mkdir -p /tmp/render-poc
printf '{{ user.passwordHash }}' > /tmp/render-poc/_user.liquid

node -e "
const { Liquid } = require('./dist/liquid.node.js');
const liquid = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: false, root: '/tmp/render-poc' });

class User { constructor(n){ this.name = n; } }
User.prototype.passwordHash = 'bcrypt\$secret';
const u = new User('alice');

liquid.parseAndRender(
  'Direct:[{{ user.passwordHash }}] Render:[{% render \"_user.liquid\", user: user %}]',
  { user: u },
  { ownPropertyOnly: true }
).then(console.log);
"

Verified output on liquidjs 10.25.7:

Direct:[] Render:[bcrypt$secret]

The top-level expression {{ user.passwordHash }} is correctly blocked by the per-render ownPropertyOnly:true, but the same expression inside the partial loaded by {% render %} returns the prototype-chain property — proof that Context.spawn() discarded the override.

Impact

Information disclosure: Any prototype-chain property of objects passed into a {% render %} partial — including secrets, hashes, internal state, framework-injected helpers — becomes readable from inside the partial template, even when the developer used the documented per-render lockdown.
Realistic threat model: Applications that maintain ownPropertyOnly:false for backwards compatibility (or because their data layer relies on prototype methods) and lock down untrusted-template renders with parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly:true }) are protected at the top level but silently exposed inside any partial. User-controllable template content (CMS snippets, theme partials, email templates) that uses {% render %} becomes an info-leak primitive.
Distinct from existing CVE-2022-25948: the prior advisory only covered direct use of ownPropertyOnly:false; this is a failure of the documented mitigation (ownPropertyOnly:true per-render override), not a missing setting.
Distinct from the array-filter variant: same spawn() root cause, but exploitable without invoking where/reject/group_by/find/find_index/has — only requires that the template uses {% render %} (a basic templating feature) and that one of the rendered values has prototype-chain properties.

Recommended Fix

Propagate ownPropertyOnly (and any other security-relevant render options) inside Context.spawn():

// src/context/context.ts
public spawn (scope = {}) {
  return new Context(scope, this.opts, {
    sync: this.sync,
    globals: this.globals,
    strictVariables: this.strictVariables,
    ownPropertyOnly: this.ownPropertyOnly   // <-- propagate resolved per-render value
  }, {
    renderLimit: this.renderLimit,
    memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit
  })
}

Passing this.ownPropertyOnly (the resolved value, not this.opts.ownPropertyOnly) ensures any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override flows into spawned child contexts. This single change closes both the {% render %} pathway documented here and the array-filter pathway tracked separately. A regression test should assert that a partial rendered via {% render %} honours parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) against an object with prototype-chain properties.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "liquidjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "10.25.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44646"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:28:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Context.spawn()` in liquidjs creates a child `Context` for the `{% render %}` tag but does not propagate the parent context\u0027s resolved `ownPropertyOnly` value. The new context re-derives `ownPropertyOnly` from `opts.ownPropertyOnly` (the instance-level option), silently discarding any `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` override that was supplied to `parseAndRender()`. As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible `ownPropertyOnly:false` and then locks down an untrusted render with `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true })` still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any `{% render %}` partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (`where`, `reject`, `group_by`, `find`, `find_index`, `has`) \u2014 the underlying root cause in `Context.spawn()` is shared, but `{% render %}` is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage.\n\n## Details\n\nThe bug is in `Context.spawn()`:\n\n```ts\n// src/context/context.ts:105-114\npublic spawn (scope = {}) {\n  return new Context(scope, this.opts, {\n    sync: this.sync,\n    globals: this.globals,\n    strictVariables: this.strictVariables\n    // \u003c-- ownPropertyOnly is missing here\n  }, {\n    renderLimit: this.renderLimit,\n    memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit\n  })\n}\n```\n\nThe constructor resolves `ownPropertyOnly` as:\n\n```ts\n// src/context/context.ts:47\nthis.ownPropertyOnly = renderOptions.ownPropertyOnly ?? opts.ownPropertyOnly\n```\n\nBecause `spawn()` passes a `RenderOptions` object with no `ownPropertyOnly`, the child context falls back to `opts.ownPropertyOnly` (the instance-level option), throwing away any per-render override that the parent context had applied. `this.opts` is the raw normalized instance options object; it is not mutated to reflect render-time overrides.\n\nThe `{% render %}` tag at `src/tags/render.ts:51-77` calls `spawn()` to build the partial\u0027s isolated scope:\n\n```ts\n* render (ctx: Context, emitter: Emitter): Generator\u003cunknown, void, unknown\u003e {\n  const { liquid, hash } = this\n  const filepath = (yield renderFilePath(this[\u0027file\u0027], ctx, liquid)) as string\n  assert(filepath, () =\u003e `illegal file path \"${filepath}\"`)\n\n  const childCtx = ctx.spawn()                    // \u003c-- ownPropertyOnly lost here\n  const scope = childCtx.bottom()\n  __assign(scope, yield hash.render(ctx))\n  ...\n  const templates = (yield liquid._parsePartialFile(filepath, childCtx.sync, this[\u0027currentFile\u0027])) as Template[]\n  yield liquid.renderer.renderTemplates(templates, childCtx, emitter)\n}\n```\n\nAll template variable lookups inside the partial then go through `childCtx.readProperty()` (`src/context/context.ts:123-135`), which calls `readJSProperty(obj, key, this.ownPropertyOnly)`. With `childCtx.ownPropertyOnly === false` (inherited from `opts`), the protective check at `src/context/context.ts:138-141` is skipped and prototype-chain properties are returned to the template:\n\n```ts\nexport function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) {\n  if (ownPropertyOnly \u0026\u0026 !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) \u0026\u0026 !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined\n  return obj[key]\n}\n```\n\nThe `{% include %}` tag is **not** affected: it does not call `spawn()`; it pushes onto the parent context\u0027s scope stack (`src/tags/include.ts:40`), so the parent\u0027s resolved `ownPropertyOnly` continues to apply.\n\nTrust model / why this matters: `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` is documented (`src/liquid-options.ts:108-111`) as \"Same as `ownPropertyOnly` on LiquidOptions, but only for current `render()` call\". It exists precisely so that developers running a non-strict instance can lock down individual untrusted renders. That contract is broken \u2014 the override is silently dropped at every partial boundary.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/render-poc\nprintf \u0027{{ user.passwordHash }}\u0027 \u003e /tmp/render-poc/_user.liquid\n\nnode -e \"\nconst { Liquid } = require(\u0027./dist/liquid.node.js\u0027);\nconst liquid = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: false, root: \u0027/tmp/render-poc\u0027 });\n\nclass User { constructor(n){ this.name = n; } }\nUser.prototype.passwordHash = \u0027bcrypt\\$secret\u0027;\nconst u = new User(\u0027alice\u0027);\n\nliquid.parseAndRender(\n  \u0027Direct:[{{ user.passwordHash }}] Render:[{% render \\\"_user.liquid\\\", user: user %}]\u0027,\n  { user: u },\n  { ownPropertyOnly: true }\n).then(console.log);\n\"\n```\n\nVerified output on liquidjs 10.25.7:\n\n```\nDirect:[] Render:[bcrypt$secret]\n```\n\nThe top-level expression `{{ user.passwordHash }}` is correctly blocked by the per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true`, but the same expression inside the partial loaded by `{% render %}` returns the prototype-chain property \u2014 proof that `Context.spawn()` discarded the override.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Information disclosure**: Any prototype-chain property of objects passed into a `{% render %}` partial \u2014 including secrets, hashes, internal state, framework-injected helpers \u2014 becomes readable from inside the partial template, even when the developer used the documented per-render lockdown.\n- **Realistic threat model**: Applications that maintain `ownPropertyOnly:false` for backwards compatibility (or because their data layer relies on prototype methods) and lock down untrusted-template renders with `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly:true })` are protected at the top level but silently exposed inside any partial. User-controllable template content (CMS snippets, theme partials, email templates) that uses `{% render %}` becomes an info-leak primitive.\n- **Distinct from existing CVE-2022-25948**: the prior advisory only covered direct use of `ownPropertyOnly:false`; this is a failure of the documented mitigation (`ownPropertyOnly:true` per-render override), not a missing setting.\n- **Distinct from the array-filter variant**: same `spawn()` root cause, but exploitable without invoking `where/reject/group_by/find/find_index/has` \u2014 only requires that the template uses `{% render %}` (a basic templating feature) and that one of the rendered values has prototype-chain properties.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nPropagate `ownPropertyOnly` (and any other security-relevant render options) inside `Context.spawn()`:\n\n```ts\n// src/context/context.ts\npublic spawn (scope = {}) {\n  return new Context(scope, this.opts, {\n    sync: this.sync,\n    globals: this.globals,\n    strictVariables: this.strictVariables,\n    ownPropertyOnly: this.ownPropertyOnly   // \u003c-- propagate resolved per-render value\n  }, {\n    renderLimit: this.renderLimit,\n    memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit\n  })\n}\n```\n\nPassing `this.ownPropertyOnly` (the resolved value, not `this.opts.ownPropertyOnly`) ensures any `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` override flows into spawned child contexts. This single change closes both the `{% render %}` pathway documented here and the array-filter pathway tracked separately. A regression test should assert that a partial rendered via `{% render %}` honours `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true })` against an object with prototype-chain properties.",
  "id": "GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T00:28:06Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T00:28:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiquidJS\u0027s `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`"
}

CVE-2026-44646 (GCVE-0-2026-44646)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-17 22:25 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:53

Title

LiquidJS: `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`

Summary

LiquidJS is a Shopify/GitHub Pages compatible template engine written in pure JavaScript. In versions 10.25.7 and below, Context.spawn() creates a child Context for the {% render %} tag but does not propagate the parent context's resolved ownPropertyOnly value, resulting in a silent bypass. The new context re-derives ownPropertyOnly from opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), silently discarding any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override that was supplied to parseAndRender(). As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible ownPropertyOnly:false and then locks down an untrusted render with parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any {% render %} partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (where, reject, group_by, find, find_index, has) — the underlying root cause in Context.spawn() is shared, but {% render %} is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage. This issue has been fixed in version 10.26.0.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-693 - Protection Mechanism Failure

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/dbbf62…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
harttle	liquidjs	Affected: < 10.26.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-44646",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-18T13:45:29.819664Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T13:53:51.906Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "liquidjs",
          "vendor": "harttle",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 10.26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "LiquidJS is a Shopify/GitHub Pages compatible template engine written in pure JavaScript. In versions 10.25.7 and below, Context.spawn() creates a child Context for the {% render %} tag but does not propagate the parent context\u0027s resolved ownPropertyOnly value, resulting in a silent bypass. The new context re-derives ownPropertyOnly from opts.ownPropertyOnly (the instance-level option), silently discarding any RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly override that was supplied to parseAndRender(). As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible ownPropertyOnly:false and then locks down an untrusted render with parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true }) still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any {% render %} partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (where, reject, group_by, find, find_index, has) \u2014 the underlying root cause in Context.spawn() is shared, but {% render %} is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage. This issue has been fixed in version 10.26.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-693",
              "description": "CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-17T22:25:15.319Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/dbbf6288030591bf6da28d8c1cce5a17bca97bb6",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/dbbf6288030591bf6da28d8c1cce5a17bca97bb6"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.26.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.26.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-9x9p-qf8f-mvjg",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "LiquidJS: `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-44646",
    "datePublished": "2026-06-17T22:25:15.319Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-07T15:30:10.875Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T13:53:51.906Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-9X9P-QF8F-MVJG

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-44646 (GCVE-0-2026-44646)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature