GHSA-9X5H-MXX6-Q576
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor (fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently ignore) skipped that check entirely.
An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype == FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller.
Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that closes the loop.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63890"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:06Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker\n\ndrivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the\ndescriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever\nrequiring dlen \u003e= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The\nnamed descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked\ntheir per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor\n(fip_dtype \u003e= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently\nignore) skipped that check entirely.\n\nAn unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang\nfcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely\nby emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype ==\nFIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes\nper iteration and the loop condition rlen \u003e= sizeof(*desc) stayed true\nforever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller.\n\nTighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen \u003c sizeof(struct\nfip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the\ndescriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same\nlower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that\ncloses the loop.",
"id": "GHSA-9x5h-mxx6-q576",
"modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e3c6e5a8fc15a74dfb1e0c1df9f1da73600a81a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14dd80a20a72ce334adcc2d67402360527065948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/549859a1131052b07dff11a448e9f3221a40f260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80a0cd307205236ca28aa49bc553f58edcb9bf3a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9eed1bd59937e6828b00d2f2dfef631d964f3636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d179949d2175d2857d1c3a275a22bea58bcc5d36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d537d29d51c8b808469e5adacf3e5a0092700738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fda976f7390bb5d1e9b84ef11ebb17323038e0c6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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Nomenclature
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