GHSA-9X2V-M36V-RM8V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: reject a negative TCP header offset in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()
qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() stores skb_transport_offset(), or the inner offset, in the unsigned hdr_len. A header in front of skb->data gives a negative offset. For an offset a little below zero, pskb_may_pull() gets a small length and succeeds. Then a 64-bit kernel reads the TCP header far after the skb and can crash. Further below zero pskb_may_pull() fails.
Commit 28a57fb2c5df ("net: iptunnel: fix stale transport header during tunnel decapsulation") fixed one source of such offsets. Other code that removes bytes from the front of a packet can leave the same stale header.
Return SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO for a negative offset in the TCP branch. SKB_GSO_UDP_L4 and the other GSO types read no header and still get a wrong qdisc_pkt_len(). On a 64-bit kernel only packets that cause the read after the skb today get a new result. Then __dev_queue_xmit() drops them and returns -EINVAL, but sch_handle_ingress() ignores the result. Their content can be valid. Thus the code that leaves the header stale needs its own fix.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99636"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:17:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: reject a negative TCP header offset in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()\n\nqdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() stores skb_transport_offset(), or the inner\noffset, in the unsigned hdr_len. A header in front of skb-\u003edata gives a\nnegative offset. For an offset a little below zero, pskb_may_pull() gets a\nsmall length and succeeds. Then a 64-bit kernel reads the TCP header far\nafter the skb and can crash. Further below zero pskb_may_pull() fails.\n\nCommit 28a57fb2c5df (\"net: iptunnel: fix stale transport header during\ntunnel decapsulation\") fixed one source of such offsets. Other code that\nremoves bytes from the front of a packet can leave the same stale header.\n\nReturn SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO for a negative offset in the TCP branch.\nSKB_GSO_UDP_L4 and the other GSO types read no header and still get a wrong\nqdisc_pkt_len(). On a 64-bit kernel only packets that cause the read after\nthe skb today get a new result. Then __dev_queue_xmit() drops them and\nreturns -EINVAL, but sch_handle_ingress() ignores the result. Their content\ncan be valid. Thus the code that leaves the header stale needs its own fix.",
"id": "GHSA-9x2v-m36v-rm8v",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:05Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35d2d6e5ac0d22428b2a0216061f3330c095393c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/765af9e95c840fcbbecf34ca1e787daba8eac569"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d88be0067857b68df06a33cc056c9f05101c09d4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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