GHSA-9W8F-6H5P-XJ5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: fix race condition by adding filter's intermediate sync state
Fix a race condition in the i40e driver that leads to MAC/VLAN filters becoming corrupted and leaking. Address the issue that occurs under heavy load when multiple threads are concurrently modifying MAC/VLAN filters by setting mac and port VLAN.
- Thread T0 allocates a filter in i40e_add_filter() within i40e_ndo_set_vf_port_vlan().
- Thread T1 concurrently frees the filter in __i40e_del_filter() within i40e_ndo_set_vf_mac().
- Subsequently, i40e_service_task() calls i40e_sync_vsi_filters(), which refers to the already freed filter memory, causing corruption.
Reproduction steps: 1. Spawn multiple VFs. 2. Apply a concurrent heavy load by running parallel operations to change MAC addresses on the VFs and change port VLANs on the host. 3. Observe errors in dmesg: "Error I40E_AQ_RC_ENOSPC adding RX filters on VF XX, please set promiscuous on manually for VF XX".
Exact code for stable reproduction Intel can't open-source now.
The fix involves implementing a new intermediate filter state, I40E_FILTER_NEW_SYNC, for the time when a filter is on a tmp_add_list. These filters cannot be deleted from the hash list directly but must be removed using the full process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T18:15:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni40e: fix race condition by adding filter\u0027s intermediate sync state\n\nFix a race condition in the i40e driver that leads to MAC/VLAN filters\nbecoming corrupted and leaking. Address the issue that occurs under\nheavy load when multiple threads are concurrently modifying MAC/VLAN\nfilters by setting mac and port VLAN.\n\n1. Thread T0 allocates a filter in i40e_add_filter() within\n i40e_ndo_set_vf_port_vlan().\n2. Thread T1 concurrently frees the filter in __i40e_del_filter() within\n i40e_ndo_set_vf_mac().\n3. Subsequently, i40e_service_task() calls i40e_sync_vsi_filters(), which\n refers to the already freed filter memory, causing corruption.\n\nReproduction steps:\n1. Spawn multiple VFs.\n2. Apply a concurrent heavy load by running parallel operations to change\n MAC addresses on the VFs and change port VLANs on the host.\n3. Observe errors in dmesg:\n\"Error I40E_AQ_RC_ENOSPC adding RX filters on VF XX,\n\tplease set promiscuous on manually for VF XX\".\n\nExact code for stable reproduction Intel can\u0027t open-source now.\n\nThe fix involves implementing a new intermediate filter state,\nI40E_FILTER_NEW_SYNC, for the time when a filter is on a tmp_add_list.\nThese filters cannot be deleted from the hash list directly but\nmust be removed using the full process.",
"id": "GHSA-9w8f-6h5p-xj5x",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:32:05Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T18:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/262dc6ea5f1eb18c4d08ad83d51222d0dd0dd42a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e046f4937474bc1b9fa980c1ad8f3253fc638f6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ad3fb3bfd43feb4e15c81dffd23ac4e55742791"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf5f837d9fd27d32fb76df0a108babcaf4446ff1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f30490e9695ef7da3d0899c6a0293cc7cd373567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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