GHSA-9W3C-WC93-J4JX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-18 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()
The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an endless loop.
To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented kernel:
$ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel $ kexec -e
The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.
Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()) is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.
Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile, so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the future, other approaches should be considered.
The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported there.
[ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43331"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T14:16:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments()\n\nThe load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base\n(which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any\nsubsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins\ncrashing the kernel in an endless loop.\n\nTo reproduce the problem, it\u0027s sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented\nkernel:\n\n $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel\n $ kexec -e\n\nThe real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in\nsyzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then\ncalls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC\nand CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously.\n\nAdding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc())\nis also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead.\n\nDisabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile,\nso disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and\nphysaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the\nfuture, other approaches should be considered.\n\nThe problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported\nthere.\n\n [ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ]",
"id": "GHSA-9w3c-wc93-j4jx",
"modified": "2026-05-18T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T15:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43331"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e3e98596c2769721ade0418434852fb3af4849a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/917e3ad3321e75ca0223d5ccf26ceda116aa51e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de05c66fab8847237a9ca216934e56d3ee837f08"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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