GHSA-9RG4-GM9P-59QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: release unused CIS holds after channel attach
hci_bind_cis() and hci_connect_cis() return one hci_conn hold for the ISO layer. A new channel association consumes that hold, which is eventually released by iso_conn_free().
There are two cases where iso_chan_add() does not create an association: it returns success when the socket is already attached to the same iso_conn, and it returns -EBUSY when another socket is attached. The hold returned for the current call is unused in both cases. This occurs when deferred setup calls iso_connect_cis() again for its existing socket, or when another socket attempts to reuse the CIS.
Detect the idempotent case while the connection is locked and release the unused hold after iso_chan_add(). Also release it on -EBUSY. Do not drop it for other errors: a newly allocated iso_conn releases the transferred hold when its last temporary reference is put.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98458"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:16:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: ISO: release unused CIS holds after channel attach\n\nhci_bind_cis() and hci_connect_cis() return one hci_conn hold for the\nISO layer. A new channel association consumes that hold, which is\neventually released by iso_conn_free().\n\nThere are two cases where iso_chan_add() does not create an association:\nit returns success when the socket is already attached to the same\niso_conn, and it returns -EBUSY when another socket is attached. The\nhold returned for the current call is unused in both cases. This occurs\nwhen deferred setup calls iso_connect_cis() again for its existing\nsocket, or when another socket attempts to reuse the CIS.\n\nDetect the idempotent case while the connection is locked and release\nthe unused hold after iso_chan_add(). Also release it on -EBUSY. Do not\ndrop it for other errors: a newly allocated iso_conn releases the\ntransferred hold when its last temporary reference is put.",
"id": "GHSA-9rg4-gm9p-59qp",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98458"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fcd4dad555c96e0bd3a1b8c569f989be85c7341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0e8b70207eaf27aee0a05ec5bf2d1b6bcb004d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5fcca51177f224604e3a8c926ffd5edbeb58b09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed4c026cc4094dfb7a329b9d8df0ddd0be1b2458"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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