GHSA-9R4W-JG96-92MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 15:04 – Updated: 2026-08-28 20:48Summary
parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip
SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
Impact
For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
Root Cause
After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
Affected versions
All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).
Fix
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
- Add bound check:
SignatureHeaderSizemust not exceed remaining list space - Skip
SignatureHeaderSizebytes before both entry loops - Regression test:
TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/google/go-attestation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12681"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-1285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T02:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`parseEfiSignatureList()` in `attest/internal/events.go` does not skip\n`SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes before reading `EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST`\nsignature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.\n\n## Impact\n\nFor `hashSHA256SigGUID` lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier\u0027s trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate \u2014 breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nAfter `binary.Read(\u0026signatures.Header)` reads 28 bytes, `buf` points to the start of the `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at `sigOffset := 0` instead of `sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize`, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAll versions through commit `f877374` (2026-05-15).\n\n## Fix\n\nPull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502\n\n- Add bound check: `SignatureHeaderSize` must not exceed remaining list space\n- Skip `SignatureHeaderSize` bytes before both entry loops\n- Regression test: `TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize`",
"id": "GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv",
"modified": "2026-08-28T20:48:40Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/security/advisories/GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/commit/b6e905e7ae52937f02b5ca494dd1c6a3ac7a1003"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/releases/tag/v0.6.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.