GHSA-9PWR-GCWM-8WJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 12:31diff3 tool from GNU diffutils is vulnerable to a heap‑based buffer overflow due to multiple signed integer overflows in line‑mapping calculations. Incorrect arithmetic in mapping line ranges can result in corrupted values being used for memory allocation and loop bounds. When processing crafted diff output, these overflows may cause the application to allocate insufficient memory and subsequently perform out‑of‑bounds writes during internal processing. An attacker who can control the output of the diff program used by diff3 (e.g. via --diff-program pointing to a malicious script) can trigger out-of-bounds writes, resulting in a crash and potentially remote code execution depending on the environment.
This issue has been fixed in commit 9ff04d5b84743e331e80b589335a52c5480d1815
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53910"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-22T14:17:21Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "diff3\u00a0tool from GNU diffutils\u00a0is vulnerable to a heap\u2011based buffer overflow due to multiple signed integer overflows in line\u2011mapping calculations. Incorrect arithmetic in mapping line ranges can result in corrupted values being used for memory allocation and loop bounds.\nWhen processing crafted diff output, these overflows may cause the application to allocate insufficient memory and subsequently perform out\u2011of\u2011bounds writes during internal processing.\u00a0\nAn attacker who can control the output of the diff program used by diff3 (e.g. via --diff-program pointing to a malicious script) can trigger out-of-bounds writes, resulting in a crash and potentially remote code execution depending on the environment.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in commit 9ff04d5b84743e331e80b589335a52c5480d1815",
"id": "GHSA-9pwr-gcwm-8wj5",
"modified": "2026-07-27T12:31:16Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T15:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53910"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/07/CVE-2026-53910"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/diffutils.git/commit/?id=73ed7ce85cc78effb94daf028c9af6b4e5252e50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/diffutils.git/commit/?id=9ff04d5b84743e331e80b589335a52c5480d1815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/diffutils.git"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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