GHSA-9PC2-X9QF-7J2Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-12 20:35 – Updated: 2023-04-16 07:16
VLAI
Summary
org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-notification-activitymacro Eval Injection vulnerability
Details

Impact

Any user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the legacy notification activity macro. This macro is installed by default in XWiki.

A proof of concept exploit is

{{activity wikis="~" /~}~} {{async async=~"true~" cached=~"false~" context=~"doc.reference~"~}~}{{groovy~}~}println(~"Hello from Groovy!~"){{/groovy~}~}"/}}

If the output of this macro is

The [notifications] macro is a standalone macro and it cannot be used inline. Click on this message for details.
Hello from Groovy!"    displayMinorEvents="false" displayRSSLink="false" /}}

or similar, the XWiki installation is vulnerable. The vulnerability can be exploited via every wiki page that is editable including the user's profile, but also with just view rights using the HTMLConverter that is part of the CKEditor integration which is bundled with XWiki.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10.

Workarounds

The issue can be fixed by replacing the code of the legacy notification activity macro by the patched version. Alternatively, if the macro isn't used, the document XWiki.Notifications.Code.Legacy.ActivityMacro can also be completely deleted.

References

  • https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/94392490884635c028199275db059a4f471e57bc
  • https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20258

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki.org * Email us at Security Mailing List

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-notification-activitymacro"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.9"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.10.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-notification-activitymacro"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.0-rc-1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-notification-activitymacro"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "14.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-29209"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94",
      "CWE-95"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-12T20:35:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-15T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAny user with view rights on commonly accessible documents including the legacy notification activity macro can execute arbitrary Groovy, Python or Velocity code in XWiki leading to full access to the XWiki installation. The root cause is improper escaping of the macro parameters of the [legacy notification activity macro](https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/Legacy%20Notification%20Activity%20Macro/). This macro is installed by default in XWiki.\n\nA proof of concept exploit is\n\n```\n{{activity wikis=\"~\" /~}~} {{async async=~\"true~\" cached=~\"false~\" context=~\"doc.reference~\"~}~}{{groovy~}~}println(~\"Hello from Groovy!~\"){{/groovy~}~}\"/}}\n```\n\nIf the output of this macro is\n```\nThe [notifications] macro is a standalone macro and it cannot be used inline. Click on this message for details.\nHello from Groovy!\"    displayMinorEvents=\"false\" displayRSSLink=\"false\" /}}\n```\nor similar, the XWiki installation is vulnerable. The vulnerability can be exploited via every wiki page that is editable including the user\u0027s profile, but also with just view rights using the HTMLConverter that is part of the [CKEditor integration](https://extensions.xwiki.org/xwiki/bin/view/Extension/CKEditor%20Integration/) which is bundled with XWiki.\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe issue can be fixed by replacing the code of the legacy notification activity macro by the [patched version](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/94392490884635c028199275db059a4f471e57bc). Alternatively, if the macro isn\u0027t used, the document `XWiki.Notifications.Code.Legacy.ActivityMacro` can also be completely deleted.\n\n### References\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/94392490884635c028199275db059a4f471e57bc\n* https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20258\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/)\n* Email us at [Security Mailing List](mailto:security@xwiki.org)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-9pc2-x9qf-7j2q",
  "modified": "2023-04-16T07:16:33Z",
  "published": "2023-04-12T20:35:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-9pc2-x9qf-7j2q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29209"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/94392490884635c028199275db059a4f471e57bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-20258"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-legacy-notification-activitymacro Eval Injection vulnerability"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.