GHSA-9MQ7-FM24-R296
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-19 15:30 – Updated: 2025-09-17 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: Init ddp_comp with devm_kcalloc()
In the case where conn_routes is true we allocate an extra slot in
the ddp_comp array but mtk_drm_crtc_create() never seemed to
initialize it in the test case I ran. For me, this caused a later
crash when we looped through the array in mtk_drm_crtc_mode_valid().
This showed up for me when I booted with slub_debug=FZPUA which
poisons the memory initially. Without slub_debug I couldn't
reproduce, presumably because the later code handles the value being
NULL and in most cases (not guaranteed in all cases) the memory the
allocator returned started out as 0.
It really doesn't hurt to initialize the array with devm_kcalloc() since the array is small and the overhead of initting a handful of elements to 0 is small. In general initting memory to zero is a safer practice and usually it's suggested to only use the non-initting alloc functions if you really need to.
Let's switch the function to use an allocation function that zeros the memory. For me, this avoids the crash.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38592"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-908"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T14:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/mediatek: Init `ddp_comp` with devm_kcalloc()\n\nIn the case where `conn_routes` is true we allocate an extra slot in\nthe `ddp_comp` array but mtk_drm_crtc_create() never seemed to\ninitialize it in the test case I ran. For me, this caused a later\ncrash when we looped through the array in mtk_drm_crtc_mode_valid().\nThis showed up for me when I booted with `slub_debug=FZPUA` which\npoisons the memory initially. Without `slub_debug` I couldn\u0027t\nreproduce, presumably because the later code handles the value being\nNULL and in most cases (not guaranteed in all cases) the memory the\nallocator returned started out as 0.\n\nIt really doesn\u0027t hurt to initialize the array with devm_kcalloc()\nsince the array is small and the overhead of initting a handful of\nelements to 0 is small. In general initting memory to zero is a safer\npractice and usually it\u0027s suggested to only use the non-initting alloc\nfunctions if you really need to.\n\nLet\u0027s switch the function to use an allocation function that zeros the\nmemory. For me, this avoids the crash.",
"id": "GHSA-9mq7-fm24-r296",
"modified": "2025-09-17T21:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-06-19T15:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38592"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01a2c5123e27b3c4685bf2fc4c2e879f6e0c7b33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fe2cc3fa44f7ad7ba5f29c1a68b2b924c17b9b1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf69d0af7db917b82aceaa44b7b1b9376609da22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.