GHSA-9J3G-G39V-6MHG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:11On Amcrest IPM-721S V2.420.AC00.16.R.20160909 devices, the users on the device are divided into 2 groups "admin" and "user". However, as a part of security analysis it was identified that a low privileged user who belongs to the "user" group and who has access to login in to the web administrative interface of the device can add a new administrative user to the interface using HTTP APIs provided by the device and perform all the actions as an administrative user by using that account. If the firmware version V2.420.AC00.16.R 9/9/2016 is dissected using binwalk tool, one obtains a user-x.squashfs.img.extracted archive which contains the filesystem set up on the device that many of the binaries in the /usr folder. The binary "sonia" is the one that has the vulnerable functions that performs the various action described in HTTP APIs. If one opens this binary in IDA-pro one will notice that this follows a ARM little endian format. The function at address 0x00429084 in IDA pro is the one that processes the HTTP API request for "addUser" action. If one traces the calls to this function, it can be clearly seen that the function sub 41F38C at address 0x0041F588 parses the call received from the browser and passes it to the "addUser" function without any authorization check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-8230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "On Amcrest IPM-721S V2.420.AC00.16.R.20160909 devices, the users on the device are divided into 2 groups \"admin\" and \"user\". However, as a part of security analysis it was identified that a low privileged user who belongs to the \"user\" group and who has access to login in to the web administrative interface of the device can add a new administrative user to the interface using HTTP APIs provided by the device and perform all the actions as an administrative user by using that account. If the firmware version V2.420.AC00.16.R 9/9/2016 is dissected using binwalk tool, one obtains a _user-x.squashfs.img.extracted archive which contains the filesystem set up on the device that many of the binaries in the /usr folder. The binary \"sonia\" is the one that has the vulnerable functions that performs the various action described in HTTP APIs. If one opens this binary in IDA-pro one will notice that this follows a ARM little endian format. The function at address 0x00429084 in IDA pro is the one that processes the HTTP API request for \"addUser\" action. If one traces the calls to this function, it can be clearly seen that the function sub_ 41F38C at address 0x0041F588 parses the call received from the browser and passes it to the \"addUser\" function without any authorization check.",
"id": "GHSA-9j3g-g39v-6mhg",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:11:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:49:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethanhunnt/IoT_vulnerabilities/blob/master/Amcrest_sec_issues.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/153224/Amcrest-IPM-721S-Credential-Disclosure-Privilege-Escalation.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.