GHSA-9HW7-47P3-C6FJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-14 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-14 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver

ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver.

When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits

wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask

Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails.

When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear.

Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver.

This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking.

[also add second syzbot report]

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-98406"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T14:17:51Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver\n\nieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via\nieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is\nstill present in the driver.\n\nWhen sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the\ncall reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits\n\n  wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0\n  WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask\n\nSyzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows\nwext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling\nioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate()\nin wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls\nrdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in\ncfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but\nflags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails.\n\nWhen the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued\nduring interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the\nrunning check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear.\n\nCheck IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before\ncalling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in\ndriver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not\nin driver.\n\nThis change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in\ncfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared\nunder RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and\ndrv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free\nagainst driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other\nnot-running paths use and does not introduce new locking.\n\n[also add second syzbot report]",
  "id": "GHSA-9hw7-47p3-c6fj",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T15:32:20Z",
  "published": "2026-10-14T15:32:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98406"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d1700394e9f5d0bd9bebad8d5a50edf983f52fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4095b66acae9893dd13deb39a4331651cb2f822b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/432c8532d5ccc2af77da43ed6ef1c80495a4efe8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ba86c44b2fcb1c3175caa2456b6d58f483446ab"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7978dda63d2b109ea9c3f7a096cd1aac6542cd54"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2cd9c44777cf97be3e35c10b7c2d8f59ebb9306"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4ee5685af444024e6222ce29f6ed36adc44ffc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da2ca406f45a6e21760243152ed8d2e8e72915c2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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