GHSA-9HFJ-JG3V-C22G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-05 18:33 – Updated: 2026-11-05 18:33The Rapid7 Metasploit msf-ws suffers from a missing authentication vulnerability whereby the REST API grants an unauthenticated "bootstrap" exemption so that the very first administrator can be created when the users table is empty. While the table is empty, POST /api/v1/users is exempt from authentication by design: the route handler calls warden.authenticate!(scope: :admin_api), which resolves to AdminApiToken. The inherited ApiToken#authenticate! short-circuits and returns success!() whenever msf.auth_initialized is false, without ever evaluating AdminApiToken's administrator check. In that state the endpoint creates a user — including an administrator — for an entirely unauthenticated caller.
This issue has been fixed in version 6.5.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-121139"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T16:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Rapid7 Metasploit\u00a0msf-ws\u00a0suffers from a missing authentication vulnerability whereby the REST API grants an unauthenticated \"bootstrap\" exemption so that the very first administrator can be created when the\u00a0users\u00a0table is empty. While the table is empty,\u00a0POST /api/v1/users\u00a0is exempt from authentication by design: the route handler calls\u00a0warden.authenticate!(scope: :admin_api), which resolves to\u00a0AdminApiToken.\u00a0The inherited\u00a0ApiToken#authenticate!\u00a0short-circuits and returns\u00a0success!()\u00a0whenever\u00a0msf.auth_initialized\u00a0is false, without ever evaluating\u00a0AdminApiToken\u0027s administrator check. In that state the endpoint creates a user \u2014 including an administrator \u2014 for an entirely unauthenticated caller.\n\n\nThis issue has been fixed in version 6.5.9.",
"id": "GHSA-9hfj-jg3v-c22g",
"modified": "2026-11-05T18:33:12Z",
"published": "2026-11-05T18:33:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/pull/22039"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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