GHSA-9HC7-6W9R-WJ94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-04 18:40 – Updated: 2024-06-17 15:09Reduced entropy due to inadequate character set usage
Description
Affected versions of the nano-id crate incorrectly generated IDs using a reduced character set in the nano_id::base62 and nano_id::base58 functions. Specifically, the base62 function used a character set of 32 symbols instead of the intended 62 symbols, and the base58 function used a character set of 16 symbols instead of the intended 58 symbols. Additionally, the nano_id::gen macro is also affected when a custom character set that is not a power of 2 in size is specified.
It should be noted that nano_id::base64 is not affected by this vulnerability.
Impact
This can result in a significant reduction in entropy, making the generated IDs predictable and vulnerable to brute-force attacks when the IDs are used in security-sensitive contexts such as session tokens or unique identifiers.
Patches
The flaws were corrected in commit a9022772b2f1ce38929b5b81eccc670ac9d3ab23 by updating the the nano_id::gen macro to use all specified characters correctly.
PoC
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
fn main() {
test_base58();
test_base62();
}
fn test_base58() {
let mut produced_symbols = BTreeSet::new();
for _ in 0..100_000 {
let id = nano_id::base58::<10>();
for c in id.chars() {
produced_symbols.insert(c);
}
}
println!(
"{} symbols generated from nano_id::base58",
produced_symbols.len()
);
}
fn test_base62() {
let mut produced_symbols = BTreeSet::new();
for _ in 0..100_000 {
let id = nano_id::base62::<10>();
for c in id.chars() {
produced_symbols.insert(c);
}
}
println!(
"{} symbols generated from nano_id::base62",
produced_symbols.len()
);
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "nano-id"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-36400"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-331"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-04T18:40:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-04T15:15:46Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# Reduced entropy due to inadequate character set usage\n\n## Description\n\nAffected versions of the nano-id crate incorrectly generated IDs using a reduced character set in the `nano_id::base62` and `nano_id::base58` functions. Specifically, the `base62` function used a character set of 32 symbols instead of the intended 62 symbols, and the `base58` function used a character set of 16 symbols instead of the intended 58 symbols. Additionally, the `nano_id::gen` macro is also affected when a custom character set that is not a power of 2 in size is specified.\n\nIt should be noted that `nano_id::base64` is not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can result in a significant reduction in entropy, making the generated IDs predictable and vulnerable to brute-force attacks when the IDs are used in security-sensitive contexts such as session tokens or unique identifiers.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe flaws were corrected in commit [a9022772b2f1ce38929b5b81eccc670ac9d3ab23](https://github.com/viz-rs/nano-id/commit/a9022772b2f1ce38929b5b81eccc670ac9d3ab23) by updating the the `nano_id::gen` macro to use all specified characters correctly.\n\n## PoC\n\n```rust\nuse std::collections::BTreeSet;\n\nfn main() {\n test_base58();\n test_base62();\n}\n\nfn test_base58() {\n let mut produced_symbols = BTreeSet::new();\n\n for _ in 0..100_000 {\n let id = nano_id::base58::\u003c10\u003e();\n for c in id.chars() {\n produced_symbols.insert(c);\n }\n }\n\n println!(\n \"{} symbols generated from nano_id::base58\",\n produced_symbols.len()\n );\n}\n\nfn test_base62() {\n let mut produced_symbols = BTreeSet::new();\n\n for _ in 0..100_000 {\n let id = nano_id::base62::\u003c10\u003e();\n for c in id.chars() {\n produced_symbols.insert(c);\n }\n }\n\n println!(\n \"{} symbols generated from nano_id::base62\",\n produced_symbols.len()\n );\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-9hc7-6w9r-wj94",
"modified": "2024-06-17T15:09:50Z",
"published": "2024-06-04T18:40:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/viz-rs/nano-id/security/advisories/GHSA-9hc7-6w9r-wj94"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/viz-rs/nano-id/commit/a9022772b2f1ce38929b5b81eccc670ac9d3ab23"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/viz-rs/nano-id"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0343.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unable to generate the correct character set"
}
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