GHSA-9GQ9-XVP8-XM4M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/msg_ring: ensure io_kiocb freeing is deferred for RCU
syzbot reports that defer/local task_work adding via msg_ring can hit a request that has been freed:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19356 Comm: iou-wrk-19354 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-00108-g17bbde2e1716 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline] print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634 io_req_local_work_add io_uring/io_uring.c:1184 [inline] __io_req_task_work_add+0x589/0x950 io_uring/io_uring.c:1252 io_msg_remote_post io_uring/msg_ring.c:103 [inline] io_msg_data_remote io_uring/msg_ring.c:133 [inline] __io_msg_ring_data+0x820/0xaa0 io_uring/msg_ring.c:151 io_msg_ring_data io_uring/msg_ring.c:173 [inline] io_msg_ring+0x134/0xa00 io_uring/msg_ring.c:314 __io_issue_sqe+0x17e/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1739 io_issue_sqe+0x165/0xfd0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1762 io_wq_submit_work+0x6e9/0xb90 io_uring/io_uring.c:1874 io_worker_handle_work+0x7cd/0x1180 io_uring/io-wq.c:642 io_wq_worker+0x42f/0xeb0 io_uring/io-wq.c:696 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
which is supposed to be safe with how requests are allocated. But msg ring requests alloc and free on their own, and hence must defer freeing to a sane time.
Add an rcu_head and use kfree_rcu() in both spots where requests are freed. Only the one in io_msg_tw_complete() is strictly required as it has been visible on the other ring, but use it consistently in the other spot as well.
This should not cause any other issues outside of KASAN rightfully complaining about it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38453"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T16:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/msg_ring: ensure io_kiocb freeing is deferred for RCU\n\nsyzbot reports that defer/local task_work adding via msg_ring can hit\na request that has been freed:\n\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 19356 Comm: iou-wrk-19354 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller-00108-g17bbde2e1716 #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]\n print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521\n kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634\n io_req_local_work_add io_uring/io_uring.c:1184 [inline]\n __io_req_task_work_add+0x589/0x950 io_uring/io_uring.c:1252\n io_msg_remote_post io_uring/msg_ring.c:103 [inline]\n io_msg_data_remote io_uring/msg_ring.c:133 [inline]\n __io_msg_ring_data+0x820/0xaa0 io_uring/msg_ring.c:151\n io_msg_ring_data io_uring/msg_ring.c:173 [inline]\n io_msg_ring+0x134/0xa00 io_uring/msg_ring.c:314\n __io_issue_sqe+0x17e/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1739\n io_issue_sqe+0x165/0xfd0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1762\n io_wq_submit_work+0x6e9/0xb90 io_uring/io_uring.c:1874\n io_worker_handle_work+0x7cd/0x1180 io_uring/io-wq.c:642\n io_wq_worker+0x42f/0xeb0 io_uring/io-wq.c:696\n ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nwhich is supposed to be safe with how requests are allocated. But msg\nring requests alloc and free on their own, and hence must defer freeing\nto a sane time.\n\nAdd an rcu_head and use kfree_rcu() in both spots where requests are\nfreed. Only the one in io_msg_tw_complete() is strictly required as it\nhas been visible on the other ring, but use it consistently in the other\nspot as well.\n\nThis should not cause any other issues outside of KASAN rightfully\ncomplaining about it.",
"id": "GHSA-9gq9-xvp8-xm4m",
"modified": "2025-11-19T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2025-07-25T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38453"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/094ba14a471cc6c68078c7ad488539eaf32c2277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5b3432f4a6b418b8bd8fc91f38efbf17a77167a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc582cd26e888b0652bc1494f252329453fd3b23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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