GHSA-9FW9-8C49-QCH8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:38 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:38Summary
MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm allows an authenticated user to update
the authentication column (default: email) without verifying their current password.
Because email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after
the attacker's session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password
reset from outside the system.
The password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires old_password
verification, so the gap is asymmetric.
Details
The postAccountInfoForm action passes $request->validated() directly to
$user->update(). The AccountInfoRequest whitelists the authentication column
(email by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with
ChangePasswordRequest, which uses Hash::check against the stored password before
allowing any change.
Scenarios where this is exploitable include: - A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel) - An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving
Patch
Fixed in #5990 — the
authentication column is now protected by a current_password check (mirroring
ChangePasswordRequest) whenever its value changes.
A stronger mitigation — sending a verification link to the new address before
persisting the change — can be layered on top using Laravel's MustVerifyEmail flow.
Affected versions
All versions prior to 6.8.14 / 7.0.38.
Fixed versions
- 6.x: 6.8.14
- 7.x: 7.0.38
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.8.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "backpack/crud"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-620"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:38:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`MyAccountController::postAccountInfoForm` allows an authenticated user to update\nthe authentication column (default: `email`) without verifying their current password.\nBecause email is the account-recovery anchor, this enables account takeover after\nthe attacker\u0027s session ends: the new email address can be used to request a password\nreset from outside the system.\n\nThe password-change endpoint in the same controller correctly requires `old_password`\nverification, so the gap is asymmetric.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `postAccountInfoForm` action passes `$request-\u003evalidated()` directly to\n`$user-\u003eupdate()`. The `AccountInfoRequest` whitelists the authentication column\n(`email` by default) with no ownership challenge. Contrast this with\n`ChangePasswordRequest`, which uses `Hash::check` against the stored password before\nallowing any change.\n\nScenarios where this is exploitable include:\n- A brief unauthorized session (e.g. unattended workstation, XSS in the admin panel)\n- An insider/offboarding case where a departing admin sets a personal email address\n before access is revoked, then resets the password after leaving\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [#5990](https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5990) \u2014 the\nauthentication column is now protected by a `current_password` check (mirroring\n`ChangePasswordRequest`) whenever its value changes.\n\nA stronger mitigation \u2014 sending a verification link to the new address before\npersisting the change \u2014 can be layered on top using Laravel\u0027s `MustVerifyEmail` flow.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAll versions prior to 6.8.14 / 7.0.38.\n\n## Fixed versions\n\n- 6.x: 6.8.14\n- 7.x: 7.0.38",
"id": "GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:38:30Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:38:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/security/advisories/GHSA-9fw9-8c49-qch8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/pull/5990"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/6.8.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Laravel-Backpack/CRUD/releases/tag/7.0.38"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Laravel Backpack CRUD: MyAccountController allows changing the login email without a current-password check"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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